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Articles
Incentive and Expectation in Copyright
SARA K. STADLER*
INTRODUCTION
Nothing is more fundamental to copyright law than the concept of
incentives. In exercise of its authority under the Constitution, Congress
has enacted the Copyright Act to "promote the Progress of Science" by
granting to "Authors" a handful of exclusive rights in their "Writings."'
Courts have held that the primary way in which the Act promotes
learning is by providing creators with the incentives to create and to
distribute copies of their works to the public.2 Among scholars, too,
* B.A., Emory University; J.D., University of Virginia School of Law: Associate Professor of
Law, Emory University School of Law. I am grateful to Robert B. Ahdieh, Anita Bernstein, Robert
Brauneis, William W. Buzbee, William J. Carney, Robert C. Denicola, Richard D. Freer, Laura A.
Heymann, Orin S. Kerr, Mark A. Lemley, Kay L. Levine, Michael J. Perry, Polly J. Price, Robert A.
Schapiro, Julie Seaman, and the participants in the Works in Progress Series of the Intellectual
Property Law Program at The George Washington University Law School for giving me the benefit of
their thoughts on an earlier draft of this Article. William W. Buzbee provided me with particularly
helpful comments, for which I am particularly grateful. I also would like to thank Gary Feldon, Jason
M. Prine, and Dana Yankowitz for providing me with able research assistance.
I. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8; Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § iOl, 90 Stat. 2541
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § iOi-lo (2000)).
2. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975), superseded by statute,
Copyright Act of 1976 § IIO(5), as recognized in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949
F.2d 1482, 1488 (199I) ("The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an
'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for
the general public good."); Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 797 (2003)
("'[It is incentive language that pervades the Supreme Court's copyright jurisprudence.' and it is
through incentive language that judges are most empowered to make copyright law work as it should."
(quoting Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1203
(I996))).
Throughout this Article, I use the word "incentive" to indicate both the incentive to create
and the incentive to provide the public with the tangible products of creation. See Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (I985) ("By establishing a marketable right to the
use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas."):
Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 187 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) ("Achieving that
fundamental objective of the copyright laws requires providing incentives both to the creation of
works of art and to their dissemination." (citing Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156)); see also Marshall Leaffer,
[433]
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questions of incentives play a lead role 3 in determining which rights
copyright owners should enjoy 4 and which rights they should not.' In her
important article on the subject of fair use, for example, Professor
Wendy Gordon proposed to apply the defense only when (a) the market
had "failed" and (b) the accused use would advance the public interest
and would not "substantially impair[ ]" creative incentives. Scholars may
disagree as to whether Congress is providing creators with the optimal
amount of these incentives,7 but one suspects that most agree with
Professor Lawrence Lessig, who has stated that while "we protect
intellectual property to provide the owner sufficient incentive to produce
such property," "'[s]ufficient incentive' . .. is something less than 'perfect
control.'
8
The Uncertain Future of Fair Use in a Global Information Marketplace, 62 OHIo ST. L.J. 849, 851
(2001) (characterizing the "ultimate goal of copyright" as "the dissemination of... information for the
public benefit"); Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 724 n.177
(2003) ("Copyright protection is designed to encourage dissemination as well as creation."); L. Ray
Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 8 (1987) ("Copyright ...
originally functioned to encourage not creation, but distribution.").
3. See F. Gregory Lastowka, Free Access and the Future of Copyright, 27 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 293, 301 (2001) ("The predominant theory today in the United States is that copyright
serves as an incentive to increase creative production." (citing Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab.,
797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d Cir. 1996)); Stephen M. McJohn, Fair Use and Privatization in Copyright, 35
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 77 (199 8) ("The conventional view is that copyright served as [a] necessary
incentive for authors to produce creative works .... ); Timothy Wu, Copyright's Communications
Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 282 (2004) ("As Mark Lemley expresses the conventional wisdom,
'both the United States Constitution and judicial decisions seem to acknowledge the primacy of
incentive theory in justifying intellectual property."' (quoting Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of
Improvement In Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993 (1997))).
4. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, lo6 YALE L.J. 283,
359-60 (1996) (discussing the importance of incentive in determining the scope of the adaptation right
in 17 U.S.C. § io6(2)); William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the
Wake of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1639, 1647-49 (2004) (discussing the importance of incentive in
determining the scope of the reproduction right in 17 U.S.C. § io6(1)).
5. See Hughes, supra note 2, at 777-78 (discussing the importance of incentive in determining
the scope of the fair use defense in 17 U.S.C. § 107); see also William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the
Fair Use Doctrine, ioI HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1687 (1988); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on
the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1150 (1990).
6. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600. I6o (1982). Professor Gordon since has
clarified her stance on fair use as market failure, although she continues to argue that in cases
presenting what she terms a defense of "excuse," "the incentive effects are likely to be crucial to the
analysis." Wendy J. Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Transaction Costs Have
Always Been Only Part of the Story, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 149, 172 (2003).
7. See Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property
Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. Iii, 125 (I999) ("[T]he goal of intellectual property law is only to provide
the 'optimal incentive,' not the largest incentive possible."). Thus, Professor Glynn Lunney argues, for
example, that Congress is providing creators with "excess incentives [that have a] corrupting
influence... on the authorship process." Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital
Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 869
(2001).
8. Lawrence Lessig, Intellectual Property and Code, II ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 635, 638
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The problem with this statement is that, increasingly, anything less
than perfect control is thought to provide creators with insufficient
incentive. The reason has to do with expectations. Over time, the
increase of rights under copyright law creates expectations among
creators, including expectations of increasingly broad rights in the future.
Creators form incentives based on those expectations. When rights under
copyright law fail to satisfy expectations, creators ask lawmakers to
provide them with broader rights in the name of "incentive." When
lawmakers comply, the result creates higher expectations among
creators, and so on. The existence of this cycle is the reason why
arguments about incentives so often tend to the tautological. It also is the
reason why courts are finding it harder and harder to identify fair uses of
copyrighted works.9 In defining the rights of creators by asking about
their incentives to create, copyright law is creating and satisfying
increasing expectations in a cycle that leads inexorably to the creation of
more rights.
In general terms, this phenomenon is a familiar one to scholars,' °
who have sought to account for it in various ways. Some scholars have
pointed to changes in technology; as inventors conceive of new means of
exploiting copyrighted works, lawmakers seek to preserve incentives by
(1996)-
9. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs.. Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1412 (6th Cir. 1996)
(Ryan, C.J., dissenting) (en banc); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 6o F.3d 913, 932 (2d Cir.
1994); Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms. 73 CuE-KENT L. REV. 1257, 1277
n.98 (1998) (writing that in both Princeton University Press and American Geophysical Union, "the
courts adopted circular arguments that because a use could be licensed, it was no longer a fair use and
must be licensed"); see also 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 13 .o5[A[ 4] (2o06) [hereinafter NIMMER] (writing of the fourth factor in 17 U.S.C. § 107, "how can
one prove a potential [impact on the market for the copyrighted work] without simply degenerating
into the tautology that defendant occupied a certain niche, which itself proves a potential market to
exist and to have been usurped?").
1o. See Michael W. Carroll, Whose Music Is It Anyway? How We Came to View Musical
Expression as a Form of Property, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1496 (2004) (observing that "the norms of artistic
resentment often are shaped by law," leading to a "baseline [that] shifts"); Dennis S. Karjala,
Copyright Protection of Operating Software, Copyright Misuse, and Antitrust, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'V I6I, 163 (1999) ("Congress has a ratchet for copyright protection that sends it in only one
direction-more for owners of existing copyrights and less for current and future authors and for the
public generally." (emphasis added)); Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337,
344 (2002) ("Recently, copyright legislation has seemed to be a one-way ratchet, increasing the subject
matter, scope, and duration of copyright with every amendment."); David McGowan, Why the First
Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy, 65 U. PiTT. L. REV. 281, 282 (2004) ("Many copyright
scholars object to the way Congress deals with their subject. With good reason, they feel Congress
wields a copyright ratchet: terms get longer, and the scope of rights gets wider, but never the
reverse.") Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How
Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 543 (2004) ("Legally, then, copyright has been a one-way ratchet
covering more works and granting more rights for a longer time."); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman,
Adrift in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act: The Sequel, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 279, 290 (2001)
("Does this mean we are stuck in a one-way ratchet whenever users' and information providers'
interests collide? I fear the answer is yes unless we think of a different way to come at this debate.").
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granting creators (and copyright owners)" the ability to profit from that
exploitation. As Professor Jane Ginsburg has argued, recent
amendments to the copyright law "appropriately reach[ ] out to address
new problems prompted by new technologies, so as to strike a happier
balance" between the interests of copyright owners, distributors, and
users.'" For other scholars, the phenomenon is less benign (and the
balance less "happy") because it serves as evidence of legislative
capture.'3 As Professor Jessica Litman and others have documented,
Congress increasingly relies upon stakeholders to propose (and even to
draft) amendments to the Copyright Act.'4 Given the provenance of the
law, it is no wonder, these scholars argue, that the history of copyright is
characterized by inexorable rights creation. Professor Timothy Wu has
even linked the foregoing arguments by showing, persuasively, that
changes in technology produce instability, which in turn leads "rival
disseminators" of copyrighted works to "invest in efforts to obtain...
favorable governmental action."' 5
While each of these arguments has merit, none addresses the root
cause of the cycle of rights creation, which has more to do with history
and rhetoric than it does with technology or politics. Lawmakers have
presided over an increasingly broad copyright law because creators have
succeeded in defining the terms of the debate. In the nineteenth century,
creators pushed lawmakers to enact copyright legislation confirming
their natural rights in the products of their intellectual labors.'6 In time,
however, the Supreme Court rejected this labor theory of copyright in
favor of an instrumentalist (incentives) approach, holding in 1932, for
it. "Creators" often are distinct from "copyright owners," of course. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)
(2000) (governing transfer of ownership). In this Article, I use the word "creators" most often, but in
doing so I do not mean to exclude copyright owners, where appropriate.
12. Jane C. Ginsburg, Essay: How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
6I, 64 (2002).
13. See Tom W. Bell, Escape From Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory Failure in the
Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 757 (2001) ("[T]he Copyright Act appears to
have fallen into a vicious cycle, creating beneficiaries who use their clout to lobby for still greater
benefits.").
14. See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
857, 86o-6i (1987); Sterk, supra note 2, at 1248.
15. Wu, supra note 3, at 288, 294; id. at 292-97; accord Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 917, 956 (2005) ("'The introduction of new technology is always disruptive to
old markets, and particularly to those copyright owners whose works are sold through well-established
distribution mechanisms."' (quoting MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1167 (9 th Cir.
2004), vacated, 545 U.S. 913 (2005))).
16. Boston publisher Nahum Capen wrote in 1844 that there could be "no proposition more
obvious than ... [tihat the products of mind should be secured to their respective authors; that these
should enjoy their advantages to the utmost." MEMORIAL OF NAHUM CAPEN, OF BOSTON,
MASSACHUSETTS, ON THE SUBJECT OF INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT, H.R. Doc. No. 28-61, at 6 (844).
Capen went on to say that creators should be able to "live and labor uninterruptedly; that their minds
may be unembarrassed by want and poverty." Id.; accord infra Part I.C.
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example, that "the primary object in conferring the [copyright] monopoly
lie[s] in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of
authors.' 7 According to the Court, the public was to derive that benefit
through the instrument of inducement, that is, by the "encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain."' 8 As this incentive theory has gained
in prominence, copyright owners have not adjusted their goals; they have
simply adjusted the rhetoric by which they demand legislative action. In
other words, they have learned to speak the language of incentives.
Instead of defining "incentive" to mean optimal incentive or, as
Professor Lessig phrased it, "sufficient incentive,"' 9 copyright owners
have defined their incentives based on their expectations of enjoying
something that approaches, as near as possible, perfect control over their
works. At the very least, copyright owners expect to enjoy rights as good
as the ones they have enjoyed in the past, and as Professor Julie Cohen
has pointed out, "a right insulated by a penumbra of monetary
expectation will be relatively impervious to legislative change.""
Enter the courts: Professor Yochai Benkler has argued that "it is the
role of courts to prevent the systematic and excessive expansion of
exclusive rights by serving as a backstop against this political economy."2I
Resorting to the courts might be a workable solution if the problem at
hand were only one of legislative capture.2 Given the extent to which
creators have succeeded in equating sufficient incentive with increasing
control, however, courts cannot do much to confine rights in copyrighted
works without confining the inquiry into incentives, too. As Professor
Litman put it, "[i]f we treat the [incentive] model as an accurate
description of reality rather than a useful rhetorical device, then we are
trapped in a construct in which there is no good reason why copyrights
should not cover everything and last forever." 3 Consider the case of
Eldred v. Ashcroft, in which the Supreme Court was asked to decide the
17. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
I8. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954), superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-553, § 102, 90 Stat. 2598, 2544-45 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2002)), as
recognized in Fabrica, Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 89o , 892-93 (9th Cir. 1983).
19. Lessig, supra note 8, at 638.
20. Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights
Management," 97 MicH. L. REV. 462, 509 (1998); accord Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for
Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV.
281, 322 (1970) ("[E]xpectations of authors and publishers have been built upon the present system.
The 'demoralization' costs of undermining these expectations may be considerable.").
2 1. Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of the
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 197 (2003).
22. I use the word "might" because in Eldred v. Ashcroft, Justice Ginsburg observed that
"[c]alibrating rational economic incentives,... like 'fashion[ing] ... new rules [in light of] new
technology,' is a task primarily for Congress, not the courts." 537 U.S. t86, 207 n.15 (2003) (quoting
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,431 (1984)).
23. Litman, supra note to, at 344.
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constitutionality of a law adding twenty years to existing and future terms
of copyright. 4 While the Court upheld the law as a rational exercise of
legislative power, 5 Justice Breyer dissented, writing that "no one could
reasonably conclude" that the incentive theory justified the legislation
because "[t]he extension will not act as an economic spur encouraging
authors to create new works."'"6 He was probably right, but creators,
predictably, had told Congress that the extension would encourage them
to create new works.27 Because Justice Breyer found "undeniably true
propositions about the value of incentives in general,'' 18 that is, because
he subscribed to the incentive theory, he was unable to articulate exactly
what was wrong with the particular incentives that Congress believed
sufficient to justify the legislation. 9
In 1970, Justice (then Professor) Breyer warned that "expectations
of authors and publishers have been built upon the present system," and
that "[t]he 'demoralization' costs of undermining these expectations may
be considerable. 30 But what if creators have come to expect too much?
Must lawmakers locate the boundaries of copyright so as to satisfy those
expectations? In an article on the subject of transitions from one tax
system to another, Professor Michael Graetz once pointed out the
inherent circularity in arguments that the government has an obligation
to compensate those taxpayers who act in reliance on existing law.3' "In
short," he wrote, "the argument asserts that people have a right to
protection merely because.,, they now expect such protection... and
their asserted rights legitimate their expectations."3 He proposed to
escape this circularity by "be[ing] guided not by the existence of
expectations, but rather by some independent normative vision of what
people should be entitled to expect."33 If, as I argue, copyright law (like
tax law) is an instrument of behavior, then lawmakers must decide which
behaviors to encourage and which ones to discourage.34 Making this
decision requires lawmakers to ask not what rights people actually expect
24. 537 U.S. at 199.
25. See id. at 208 (finding that the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 is "a rational
enactment" and observing that "we are not at liberty to second-guess congressional determinations
and policy judgments of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise they may be").
26. Id. at 254 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
27. See id. at 207 n.15 (majority opinion).
28. Id. at 255 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
29. See infra Part II.B.; see also Litman, supra note to, at 344.
30. Breyer, supra note 20.
31. See Michael J. Graetz, Retroactivity Revisited, 98 HARV. L. REV. 182o, 1823 (1985).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. As Professor Cohen put it, if "entitlement structures play a role in determining the kinds of
new works that will be produced-then we cannot escape making decisions about substance, and it is
folly to pretend otherwise." Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1799,
18oo (20o0).
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from copyright law, but what rights they should be entitled to expect.
This Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, I examine how creators
and their representatives have characterized their expectations of
copyright law over the last two centuries. In Part II, I discuss the
functioning and impact of circularities of expectation, using examples
from other areas of law to inform analyses both of the phenomenon in
copyright law and the results it produced in Eldred v. Ashcroft. Finally, in
Part III, I argue that Congress must decide what it means to provide
creators with "incentives"-for only Congress can "break the circle"35 by
deciding what rights creators are entitled to expect from copyright law.
I. THE RHETORIC OF EXPECTATION
Congress enacted its first copyright statute in I790.36 The statute was
limited in scope: Authors of "map[s], chart[s],... or books" (and their
assigns) were granted the exclusive rights of "printing, reprinting,
publishing and vending" copies of those works, so long as they deposited
a copy of the work with the clerk of their local district court prior to
publication and with the Secretary of State within six months after
publication.37 They were also required to publish notice of their claims
(within two months of publication) in "one or more of the newspapers
printed in the United States, for a space of four weeks.",3 Only if authors
jumped through these hoops did they succeed to a copyright that sprang
into being upon publication and endured for an initial term of fourteen
years.39 If they were alive to claim it, authors could claim a renewal term
of fourteen more years, for a total of twenty-eight.40
Today, most authors have the exclusive right to reproduce their
works, or portions thereof, in copies; to adapt their works into any
number of "derivatives"; to distribute those copies and derivatives to the
public by sale, lease, or lending; to perform their works, or portions
thereof, in public; and to display their works, or portions thereof, to the
public.' In return, authors must simply deposit two copies of their works
with the Register of Copyrights, with little penalty for failure to comply."
They need not register their works unless they wish to sue someone for
35. See Prater v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 802 F.2d 948, 953 (7th Cir. 1986) ("The way to break the
circle is to bring in the other purpose of forbidding ex post facto laws-that of keeping the legislature
from getting involved in the executive and judicial functions of prosecuting and punishing past acts.").
36. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. I5, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1802) (securing the copies of maps, charts,
and books to their authors and proprietors).
37- Id. §§ 1,3,4.
38. Id. § 3.
39. Id. § i.
40. Id.
4. See 17 U.S.C. § lo6 (2ooo).
42. See id. § 407(a), (d).
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infringement. 43 They need not mark copies of their works with any notice
of copyright.' Their exclusive rights. spring into being the moment they
fix their works in tangible form,45 and their rights endure for seventy
years after they die. 46 The only limitations on these rights are a handful of
extremely technical defenses47 and a fair use defense under which the
only non-infringing uses are increasingly limited to parodies 4' and,
sometimes, other uses that a court finds to be "transformative.
49
Clearly, creators have increased their expectations of copyright law
over the last two centuries; but why? A number of impulses have led to
this increase. I have divided these impulses into three categories: First,
when creators (and copyright owners) perceive that others are enjoying
greater rights than they do, they expect to enjoy rights "as good," and
their demands of lawmakers reflect that expectation. Second, when
creators perceive an increase in the breadth of copyright over time, they
expect to receive a further increase (and "better" rights) for themselves.
Third, and most fundamental, creators long have believed themselves to
possess durable, even natural rights in the products of their intellectual
labors. This belief has created the expectation of enjoying what Professor
Lessig termed "perfect control" over their works," regardless of whether
the prevailing theory of copyright supports such a belief. Taken together,
these three impulses (and perhaps others) form the basis of a rhetoric of
expectation. Creators have used that rhetoric to justify their requests for
broader rights for almost two hundred years.
A. RIGHTS "As GOOD"
One way in which creators have justified their demands for broader
rights under copyright law is by pointing to the rights that others enjoy
and by demanding to enjoy rights "as good." In 1906, for example,
Senator Reed Smoot asked a manufacturer of player pianos whether he
had any "idea of being protected any more than any other concern[.]"'"
43. See id. §§ 4o8(a), 411(a).
44. See id. § 4of(a).
45. See id. § 102(a).
46. Id. § 302(a).
47. See id. §§ 108-122.
48. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 51o U.S. 569 579, 583 (1994) (holding a rap version
of the song "Oh, Pretty Woman" to be a parody, and thus a fair use, and stating that parody "has an
obvious claim to [the] transformative value" for which courts look in deciding fair use cases). But see
Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., io9 F.3d 1394, 14o6 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding no
parody in "The Cat NOT in the Hat!," a book about the murder trial of 0. J. Simpson); Rogers v.
Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding no parody in a Jeff Koons sculpture entitled "String of
Puppies").
49. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 8si, 822 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding the use of
"thumbnails" on a search engine to be transformative of the original photographs, and thus a fair use).
5o. Lessig, supra note 8, at 638.
5I. Arguments on S. 6330 and H.R. 19853 Before the Comms. on Patents of the S. and H.R.,
[Vol. 58:433
February 2007] INCENTIVE AND EXPECTATION IN COPYRIGHT 441
The manufacturer replied, "No, sir; we want to have only the same rights
as anybody else."52 What could be more reasonable?
Creators have begun by comparing themselves to those who own
copyright in other types of copyrightable works. Consider the exclusive
right of public performance: before 1897, only playwrights enjoyed this
right; songwriters enjoyed only the exclusive rights of "printing,
reprinting, publishing, and vending" physical copies of their works,53 and
thus "it had never been doubted but that the purchaser of a piece of
[sheet] music took it with the right to both its use and disposal."54 In 1897,
however, Congress extended the performance right to songwriters,55 who
likely argued that, like plays, their works were meant to be performed,
and thus, like playwrights, they were entitled to reap the benefits of those
performances nationwide. s6 Fearing a monopoly in player piano rolls,
Congress later narrowed the performance right in musical works by
requiring songwriters to accept a compulsory royalty of two cents per
mechanical reproduction57 (known as the "mechanical license")95
Predictably, songwriters responded by comparing themselves to other
creators whose works were not subject to the license. As Nathan Burkan,
counsel for the songwriters, argued before the House Committee on
Patents in 1925:
We can protect ourselves by your giving us... the same control over
the reproduction of our works on records and rolls as the existing law
gives to the author of a drama, novel, or short story .... Equal
protection should be given to the song writer.... There is an arbitrary
discrimination in this law against one class of writers as against every
other class of writers in the world. 9
Conjointly, to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 59th Cong. I 5 (I9O6)
[hereinafter Arguments on S. 6330 and H.R. 19853] (statement of John J. O'Connell).
52. Id.
53. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. i6, § 1, 4 Stat. 436; accord The Mikado Case, 25 F. 183, 186-87
(C.C.N.Y. 1885) (noting that American law, unlike "[t]he English statutes," did not "protect
composers against the unauthorized performance of a musical composition," and adding that "[w]hile
it is much to be regretted that our statutes do not.., protect the author or proprietor in all the uses to
which literary property may be legitimately applied, it is not the judicial function to supply the
defect").
54. H.R. REP. No. 59-4955, at i (I9O6).
55. Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481.
56. See White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, i6 (19o8) ("The purposes of the
[1897] amendment evidently was to put musical compositions on the footing of dramatic
compositions .... ).
57. Act of Mar. 4, i909, ch. 320, § i(e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075-76. Congress believed that this
provision was necessary to prevent the companies from gaining a monopoly in the market for player
piano rolls. See H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 7 (909). In i9o9, Congress also added a "for profit"
limitation to the statute. See Act of Mar. 4, i9O9 § i(e).
58. See Copyright Office, Copyright Royalty Rates: Section i5, The Mechanical License,
http://www.copyright.gov/carp/m2ooa.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2007).
59. Copyrights: Hearings on H.R. 11258 Before the Comm. on Patents, 68th Cong. 164 (1925)
[hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 11258] (statement of Nathan Burkan, Counsel, American Society of
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Arguments like this may have convinced the committee, if not the
Congress."
Making songwriters "equal" by granting them the exclusive right of
performance led to other inequities. In 19o8, the Chairman of the
Committee on Patents expressed concern that in granting songwriters the
exclusive right of performance, Congress had provided them with a
"double right, which the publisher of a book [did] not have.",
6
'
Representative Eugene Leake replied: "That is only because [the song] is
used for two purposes. If the book could be used for another purpose,
the right would undoubtedly extend in the same wdy.''6' Not surprisingly,
the right did undoubtedly extend. When creators of and owners of
copyrights in books and poems realized that their works, too, could be
"performed" (that is, recited) over the radio and later the television, they
sought the double right for themselves. As counsel for the Authors'
League of America put it in 1951, granting the performance right to
writers of prose and poetry "would just bring the novelist or the poet into
the same position as the playwright [and] the writer of lyrics ... now
enjoy under the Copyright Act" and "would put these people on a
parity.""
Creators of other types of copyrightable works have sought parity,
too. Weary of satisfying the requirements of the design patent statute,
industrial artists sought copyright "protection for their designs the same
Composers, Authors, and Publishers, the Authors' League of America, and the American
Dramatists); see also id. at 174-75 ("But you should do no more nor less for the composer than the law
does for him who writes for motion pictures, magazines, or newspapers-treat him upon the same
basis of equality and impartiality.").
6o. See S. REP. No. 71-1732, at 27 (1931) ("There appears to be no valid reason for any distinction
between the author or owner of musical composition [sic] and the author or owner, or producer of any
other kind of property or work."); H.R. REP. No. 71-1689, at 9 (930) ("There should be no distinction
between the author or owner of a musical composition, and the author or owner of any other work.");
H.R. REP. No. 71-2o16, at 9 (1930) (same).
61. Revision of Copyright Laws: Hearings on Pending Bs. to Amend and Consolidate the Acts
Respecting Copyright Before the Comms. on Patents of the S. and H.R., 6oth Cong. 193 (19o8)
(statement of Rep. Currier).
62. Id. (statement of Rep. Eugene Leake).
63. Recording and Performing Rights in Certain Literary Works: Hearings on H.R. 3589 Before
Subcomm. No. 3 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong. 5 (195) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R.
3589] (statement of John Schulman, Counsel, Authors' League of America); accord Hearings on H.R.
3589, supra, at 2 ("The writers of literary works do not now have the protection against unauthorized
performance and recording of their property which the present law gives to playwrights, composers of
music, and the authors of lectures. H.R. 3589 would cure that inequity.") (statement of John
Schulman); H.R. REP. No. 82-I160, at 3 (195) ("If it is recognized that an individual has a proprietary
interest in the performance of that which he creates.., as evidenced by that recognition for music and
certain kinds of literary works and drama, it appears to be unfair and illogical to except books and
poems."). Demands for parity sometimes got out of hand. In 1925, unknown writers asked Congress to
guarantee them the sort of treatment that "now is voluntarily accorded to recognized authors by the
reputable business houses." Hearings on H.R. 11258, supra note 59, at 383 (statement of William
Hamilton Osborne, Council Member, Authors' League of America).
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as dramatists and authors" in the first few decades of the twentieth
century.4 Later, they argued that any distinction between their works
and artistic ones "should be dropped entirely. ' '6, In 1959, choreographers
argued that it was unfair to expect "the choreographer alone of all
creators... not [to] reap ... the rewards of his talents and efforts. 66 Less
than twenty years later, calligraphers managed to convince the Copyright
Office that calligraphy was "an art form" 6 and offered that they would
not be averse to a compulsory license like the one to which songwriters
were subject.68 And in 1990, architects argued that "[a]rchitectural art is
no less art than its counterparts in the world of sculpture and
painting. . . ";69 in fact, it was "not unlike poetry.
7
Even as they have compared themselves to each other, American
creators also have compared themselves to Europeans, who always seem
to have enjoyed broader rights, for longer periods of time, than
Americans have. Comparisons to laws on the Continent were thought to
be ideal because those laws gave the creator "a natural right of property
in his work."'" In the early days of the American republic, however, even
64. Copyrights: Hearings on H.R. 6250 and H.R. 9137 Before the Comm. on Patents, 68th Cong.
297 (1924)) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 6250 and H.R. 9137] (statement of Eric Shuler, Secretary,
Authors' League of America); see also Providing for the Registration of Designs: Hearings on H.R.
6458 and H.R. 13618 Before the Comm. on Patents, 64 th Cong. 104 (1916) [hereinafter Hearings on
H.R. 6458 and H.R. 13618] ("In other words, they want to have the benefit of the patent statute
without any preliminary examination by the Government" (statement of Edmund A. Whitman,
National Protective Repair Association)).
65. Copyright Law Revision Part 3: Preliminary Draft for Revised US Copyright Law and
Discussions and Comments on the Draft, 88th Cong. 188 (1963) (statement of Barbara Ringer,
Copyright Office). According to the future Register of Copyrights, Barbara Ringer, "[t]his is the
concept of unity of art that some countries follow." Id.
66. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVIsION iio (Comm. Print I96i) (statement of Agnes
George DeMille).
67. Copyright Law Revision Part 3: Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 9 4th Cong. 186o (975)
(statement of Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights, Library of Congress); see also id. at i86o-6i
(noting that typefaces are more original now because "the increasing use of photocomposition...
makes it possible for many more variations and a good deal more originality to be applied than could
be applied when you have to work within the confines of a metal slug.").
68. See id. at 1862-63.
69. Hearings on H.R. 3990 and H.R. 3991 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property,
and the Administration of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, iost Cong. 136 (I99O) [hereinafter
Hearings on H.R. 3990 and H.R. 39911 (remarks of the Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation); see also id. at
139 ("H.R. 3990, in our view, simply aims at putting the architect, at least as to buildings, on about the
same footing, no better and no worse, as other artists."); id. at 146 ("The protection of architectural
works should not, in The Foundation's opinion, be greater or lesser than that of other artistic works.").
70. H.R. REP. No. 101-735, at 12 (990).
71. H.R. REP. No. 4o-16, at 1 (1868). But see S. REP. No. 25-494, at 2 (1838) ("Since that period
[following the Statute of Anne], copyright in England as elsewhere has been defined, limited, and
protected by special enactments, on which alone it rests. The right of the author as thus established
and defined, is property of a peculiar character, not absolute but special, subject to conditions and
limitations.").
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English positive law provided creators with more rights than American
law did, and thus comparisons were natural and fruitful. While records of
congressional testimony from the period are scarce, Congress seems to
have extended the copyright to songwriters, in 1831, because the English
had done so first.72 Congress also extended the copyright term in 1831,
explaining that it wished "to place authors in this country more nearly
upon an equality with authors in other countries."73 By the time the
United States had acceded to the Berne Convention in I988,"4 American
and European copyright laws had converged significantly.75 Accession, in
turn, has led to further convergence through legislation designed to
comply with treaty obligations. 76
Perhaps the most interesting way in which creators have formulated
expectations of reward, however, is by comparing themselves to owners
of tangible property. According to Senator Jonathan Chace, "one of their
stock arguments" in i886 was that copyrightable works were like
72. See H.R. REP. No. 21-3, at I (t830) ("[l~t seems to your committee, with propriety, that the
law of copy-right [sic] ought to extend to musical compositions, as does the English law.").
73. Id. at I; see also id. ("While, for the most obvious reasons, the United States ought to be
foremost among nations in encouraging science and literature, by securing the fruits of intellectual
labor, she is, in this thing, very far behind them all, as a reference to their laws will show."). Congress
also may have done so because creators were thought to have perpetual rights in the products of their
labors. See Eldred, 537 U.S. 186, 236 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
75. As Professor Christopher Sprigman has argued,
[A]lthough at the level of theory one might expect our utilitarian system to operate quite
differently from systems in continental Europe that are purportedly based on a mixture of
natural and moral rights justifications, in reality copyright systems in the developed world
have converged, and now provide a set of protections that approach what one would expect
under a natural rights paradigm.
Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 523 (2004) (citing I PAUL
GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 1.13.2.3 (2d ed. 2004)). Depending on how one feels about the labor theory in
copyright, this may not be a good thing. See General Revision of the Copyright Law: Hearings Before
the Comm. on Patents, 7 2d Cong. 38 (1932) ("I think we could have an international copyright based
upon American ideals in which we are right.... You know they have the League of Nations started in
Europe, but when it is put into operation it turns out to be pretty bad.") [hereinafter General Revision
of the Copyright Law] (statement of Karl Fenning).
76. See H.R. REP. No. 101-735, at 20 (i99o) (regarding the Architectural Works Copyright
Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. io-650, tit. VII, 104 Stat. 5089, 5132 (199o) "[tihe sole purpose of
legislating at this time is to place the United States unequivocally in compliance with its Berne
Convention obligations"); H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 1o (I99O) (regarding the Visual Artists Rights Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. Ioi-65o, Title VI, 104 Stat. 5089, 5128 (I99O), "[t]his bill represents an important
initiative in the domain of moral rights, an area that [the] Berne Implementation Act left open to
future development. The prompt attention ... that Congress has shown by this, and similar, bills
should prove gratifying... to our partners in the Berne Union."): see also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 196,
205-06 (holding the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 to be rational, in part, because it
"harmonize[d] the baseline United States copyright term with the term adopted by the European
Union in 1993," thus "ensur[ing] that American authors would receive the same copyright protection
in Europe as their European counterparts"); N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 505 n.13 (2001)
(noting that "courts and Congress... may draw on numerous models for distributing copyrighted
works and remunerating authors for their distribution," citing European laws).
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"pheasants, 77 which obviously were capable of being owned (if one
could catch them). For himself, Senator Chace thought there was "no
sort of comparison between the two. ' 78 But there were plenty of people
who thought otherwise. Mark Twain believed that when it came to
property rights, works of literature were no different from a butcher shop
or a coal mine. If so, he argued, why should Congress place limits on the
duration of copyright? As he testified in 1906, "you might just as well,
after you had discovered a coal mine and worked it twenty-eight years,
have the Government step in and take it away-under what pretext? ' 79 If
a man owned a copyright, he went on, "it should be the property of that
man and his heirs forever and ever, just as a butcher shop would be, or-
I don't care-anything, I don't care what it is."" By 1932, the comparison
was the same; only the objects were different. In that year, John
Schulman, counsel for the Song Writers' Protective Association, urged
lawmakers to treat copyright "like you treat a piece of real estate or an
automobile. It is the same thing.... [A]s a lawyer, it seems to me that I




There were risks to making arguments like these. When songwriters
sought to compare songs to shoes, users responded that they were
"entirely willing" to grant songwriters the same protection that cobblers
enjoyed:82 "If a cobbler makes shoes," a music publisher testified, "and I
buy the shoes and put them in my store window, that cobbler has no right
to come down and say, 'Pay me a license fee because you are publicly
exhibiting my shoes."' , Still, the analogy to tangible property was useful
77. S. REP. No. 49-I 188, at 105 (1886) (statement of Senator Jonathan Chace, Member, Comm. on
Patents).
78. Id.
79. Arguments on S. 633o and H.R. 19853, supra note 51, at it6 (statement of Samuel L.
Clemens).
8o. Id. at 85g-2o.
81. General Revision of the Copyright Law, supra note 75, at 82-83 (statement of John Schulman,
Counsel, Song Writers' Protective Association). To this principle it was agreed that there were "no
objections." Id. at 83.
82. Hearings on H.R. 11258, supra note 59, at 301 (statement of J. G. Paine).
83. Id. Perhaps the solution was to rent the shoes, giving the erstwhile "purchaser" nothing more
than a license to be shod. Consider the following colloquy:
Mr. WALKER. According to this bill as you understand it, would it be competent for an
author to print under his copyright notice a reservation prohibiting people from doing
anything with that book except reading it themselves? Would it be competent for the author
to prohibit the sale of that book by the purchaser?
Mr. STEUART. Yes, sir.... [U]nder the absolute right of the author, he could make any
reservation he pleased. In other words, this so-called sale would be nothing but a license to
read.
Mr. MCKINNEY. May I ask a question, Mr. Steuart? Was it the object of the draftsmen of
this bill to break up the second-hand book business?
Mr. STEUART. Not at all.
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in a number of ways. If works of authorship were like tangible property,
then copyright owners should have the right to control their works
absolutely, regardless of how many new uses for those works might be
found:
A farmer sows a field of buckwheat primarily to supply his bees with
material for honey. If he finds afterwards a demand for buckwheat by
those who would make it into flour, shall he not profit by the increased
market for what his field has produced? And can it be seized for
grinding by those who will, because he planted it only for honey?"'
Furthermore, if the two species of property were comparable, as
copyright owners argued, then creators also should have the right to
claim ownership of their works at the moment of creation-not after they
had complied with the longstanding legal formalities of registration,
deposit, and notice.85 This was how the Europeans did it.86 When the
House Committee on Patents wondered how users would know whether
unmarked works were copyrighted, Nathan Burkan argued that the
burden of answering that question should fall on users. 7 As he asked (in
so many words), if you saw a donkey on the side of the road, would you
take it home, or would you assume that it was owned by someone?,8
Notwithstanding the fact that donkeys cannot fall into the public domain,
arguments like these might have resonated with the Senate, which issued
this statement in favor of "automatic copyright" in 193 1:
If a man design and build an artistic piece of furniture, it is his property
and no one can divest him of it under the law without his consent....
He is not called upon to place upon it, or upon any part of it, for
instance the words 'John Smith, his table' or 'John Doe, his desk.' The
desk or the table, or any other piece of property he owns is his and he
may claim title to it as against all the world. Automatic copyright is
intended to operate in precisely the same manner upon literary
creations or works of art. 9
Arguments on S. 6330 and H.R. 19853, supra note 51, at 164 (statement of Arthur Steuart).
84. Id. at 231 (statement of J. L. Tindale).
85. See Copyright: Hearings on H.R. 10434 Before the Comm. on Patents, 69th Cong. 223 (1926)
("We favor the abolition of all procedural requirements, such as notice, deposit of copies, and
registration of claims. In other words, we think literary property should be treated as other
property ... ") [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 10434] (statement of Lawrence B. Evans, American Bar
Association); Hearings on H.R. 11258, supra note 59, at 69 ("[O]ur property should be ours
automatically. [and it] should result from the creation of the work and not depend upon
registration.... We are simply asking for the same right in our art and work that we have in our watch
or silver. When we have done it it is ours.") (statement of Walter D. Teague).
86. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 2(2), Sep. 9, I886,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, s161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention] ("It shall ... be a matter for
legislation in the countries of the Union to prescribe that works in general or any specified categories
of works shall not be protected unless they have been fixed in some material form."); id. art. 5(2)
("The enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any formality .... ").
87. Hearings on H.R. 1o434, supra note 85, at 257-87 (1926) (brief of Nathan Burkan).
88. Id.
89. S. REP. No. 71-1732, at 20-21 (1931).
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Thus have creators argued for rights "as good": when lawmakers
extend a right to one category of claimants, claimants in other categories
expect, and therefore demand, the same right. As creators always can
find someone else who enjoys more rights than they do, this
phenomenon continues to impact the scope of copyright today.
B. "BETrER" RIGHTS
"There can be no question that the universal tendency has been and
is toward more ample protection of copyright... " For creators, this
tendency has been a move in "the right direction."9 It also has seemed to
be the natural product of a more enlightened society. As John Holbrook
testified in 1916, "this country is coming more and more to an artistic
realization; we are just coming to a development of that; and that is the
last stage in the development of a civilization."9
As civilization develops, however, so do expectations about the
nature of that development. In copyright, this phenomenon manifests
itself in the expectations of creators who, knowing that rights have
increased steadily in the past, tend to expect further increases in future.
This expectation, in turn, leads creators to think of that increase as an
entitlement, which leads them to demand increasing rights for
themselves. As a result, entitlements thought to be adequate only a few
years ago prove to be inadequate in the light of rising expectations. As
John Schulman testified in 1951, "what would probably be an exclusive
right in i9o9 has become less than an exclusive right today."93 Nor are
changes in technology entirely to blame. When Esther Hunt, a sculptor,
was asked what she thought of a copyright bill in 1925, she answered,
9o . Memorandum of the Comm. on Copyright and Trademark of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City
of New York, Sec. t8, reprinted in Arguments on S. 6330 and H.R. 19853, supra note 51, at 407 app;
accord General Revision of the Copyright Law, supra note 75, at 15 ("Another interesting line of
thought in regard to copyright is the way in which it has expanded.") (statement of Richard C. De
Wolf); H.R. REP. No. 9o-83, at 14 (1967) ("The history of copyright law has been one of gradual
expansion ... ").
9 i . Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 1361 Before the S. Comm. On Patents, Trademarks,
and Copyrights of the S. Comm on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 47 (1973) (statement of Herman
Finkelstein, General Counsel, American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers); accord
Hearings on H.R. 6250 and H.R. 9137, supra note 64, at 135 (informing Congress that a failure to
safeguard the rights of songwriters as against broadcasters would be "a step in the wrong direction.")
(statement of Charles Henry Butler, Counsel, National Association of Book Publishers).
92. Hearings on H.R. 6458 and H.R. 13618, supra note 64, at 187 (statement of John S. Holbrook).
This "artistic realization" apparently was a lengthy process: a publisher Larston Farrar testified in
1965, Congress needed to "get into law" a guaranteed profit for writers because "writing did not reach
its full fruition until recent decades." Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 568o, H.R.
6831, and H.R. 6835 Before the Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. t151
(1965) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 568o, H.R. 6831, and H.R. 6835] (statement of
Larston D. Farrar).
93. Hearings on H.R. 3589, supra note 63, at io (statement of John Schulman, Authors' League of
America).
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"we ... feel that it should do something more for the artists. It leaves us
in the same position regarding protection of our works as the present
bill."'94
If creators expect their rights to increase, they certainly do not
expect them to decrease. In 1924, for example, radio broadcasters asked
Congress to confine the performance rights that songwriters had enjoyed
since 1897. On behalf of songwriters, Nathan Burkan responded by
complaining that the request marked "the first time in the history of
copyright legislation that Congress has ever been asked to take away
rights once vested in the creator of any form of literary property."95 It
was, he testified, "a revolutionary and reactionary step" without
"justification or precedent"-indeed, "an unconstitutional act." 96
Language like this tended to obscure the fact that songwriters had
enjoyed the right of public performance for less than thirty years. To
some lawmakers, even in 1924, the right seemed to "always" have
existed:
Mr. BLOOM. Didn't they [songwriters] always have this control [over
the right of public performance for profit]?
Mr. HANDY. No, sir.
Mr. BLOOM. It has always been in the law.
Mr. HANDY. No, sir.
Mr. BLOOM. I beg your pardon. It has always been in the law.
Mr. HANDY. In what law?
Mr. BLOOM. In the law of I856 and 1857.
Mr. HANDY. Not as to public performances. 7
One reason why it may be easy to forget how rights were defined
(and confined) in the past is that creators can be "aggressive" in
defending their new rights-even if they never seemed to care about
them before.0 In 1926, Congressman Sol Bloom asked an artist whether
94. Hearings on H.R. 11258, supra note 59, at 473 (seeking to broaden the infringement standard
to punish imitations of artistic works) (statement of Esther Hunt); see also Copyright Law Revision,
Part 4, Further Discussions and Comments on Preliminary Draft for Revised U.S. Copyright Law,
House Comm. Print, 88th Cong. 358 (1964) [hereinafter Copyright Law Revision, Part 41 ("I concur
with the recommendations of the Authors League of America in that we should extend and not just
retain the present period of copyright protection.") (statement of Joseph Maron Joseph).
95. Hearings on H.R. 6250 and H.R. 9137, supra note 64, at 210 (statement of Nathan Burkan,
Attorney for the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 65 (statement of S. A. Handy, Attorney for the Moving Picture Theater Owners).
98. See Hearings on H.R. 3990 and H.R. 3991, supra note 69, at 1633 & n.3 ("We note that some
architects choose not to enforce these rights [i.e., rights to control further reproductions of their
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he would object if a moviemaker used one of his copyrighted works to
decorate a set. "They would have it in their film," the congressman said,
"and they would show that on the screen. Would that be an infringement
of your copyright?" The artist replied, "It would not be our idea of an
infringement at all, because we are having that happen all the time. '' , By
1964, however, expectations had changed, and both artists and
ph6tographers claimed "the privilege of being able to control the
television use of their pictorial works."'" The exercise of this privilege
required the grant of an exclusive right of public display; according to
these artists, anything else "would substantially cut down their rights," to
which they made "very strenuous objections ..... Congress granted artists
this new right as part of the Copyright Act of 1976,1"2 and by 1997, owners
of copyright in works of the visual arts were suing producers who used
those artworks as set decoration." A non-infringing act that "happen[ed]
all the time" in 1926 had become an infringing act. Today, a television
producer cannot display an artwork as set decoration without violating
section io6 of the Copyright Act-even if the display only lasts for a few
seconds. I04
A century ago, a witness implored lawmakers: "For heaven's sake,
let the copyright stop somewhere."'0" As an advocate for property rights
in industrial designs acknowledged in 1916, however, it is "difficult to
define exactly how far to go. We know where to begin," he said, "but we
do not know exactly where to stop. ' ' io6 If, as I have argued, the only way
to confine rights under copyright law is to confine the expectations of
designs "[o]nce the work is completed and paid for"]. By providing for more effective protection for
architectural works, it is likely that many of these architects will become more aggressive.") (statement
of the Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation).
99. Hearings on H.R. 10434, supra note 85, at i6o (statement of Stephen L. Newman).
too. Transcript of Meeting on 1964 Revision Bill, 89th Cong. 66 (1964).
to'. Id.
102. See Pub. L. No. 94-553, § Io6(5), 90 Stat. 2541, 2546 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§ IO6(5) (2000)). But see § io9(c) (providing the "owner of a particular copy lawfully made under this
title" the right "to display that copy publicly, either directly or by the projection of no more than one
image at a time, to viewers present at the place where the copy is located").
103. See Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 216 (2d Cir. 1998) (copyright
infringement action against producers and distributors of motion picture "Seven" for use of ten
copyrighted photographs in motion picture without permission); Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television,
Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 71-72 (2d Cir. 1997) (copyright infringement action against producer and
broadcaster of television program, which used a poster depicting artist's '"story quilt" as set
decoration); Jackson v. Warner Bros., Inc., 993 F. Supp. 585, 586-87 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (copyright
infringement action against motion picture producer for depiction of copyrighted paintings on wall of
set).
io4. See Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 77 ("ITihe principal four-to-five-second segment in which almost all
of the poster is clearly visible, albeit in less than perfect focus, reinforced by the briefer segments in
which smaller portions are visible, all totaling 26 to 27 seconds, are not de minimis copying.").
105. Arguments on S. 6330 and H.R. r9853, supra note 5I, at 32 (statement of Paul Fuller).
io6. Hearings on H.R. 6458 and H.R. 13618, supra note 64, at 23 (statement of C.R. Clifford,
Clifford & Lawton, Trade Journal Publishers).
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creators, then lawmakers might introduce limits in copyright by limiting
those expectations of increase. But lawmakers have not done so, and
expectations of copyright law have continued to increase with time.
If copyright must stop somewhere, creators would prefer it to stop
only after they have obtained "the exclusive control of [their]
property '' " "without any restriction"'0 -that is, after they had obtained
"an inherent and natural right"' in their creations. The history" of
copyright law has given them every reason to expect precisely this result,
and because they expect it, providing creators with anything less would
diminish their incentives to create. Like Justice Breyer, many (if not
most) copyright scholars subscribe to the incentive theory, believing that
copyright law exists primarily to achieve a public benefit by using private
reward to stimulate creation. Through the rhetoric of expectation,
however, creators have used the incentive theory to legitimate
expectations that are more in keeping with the philosophy of natural
right than they are with any theory of inducement. If the philosophy of
natural right was, in 1932, "at the bottom of much of the contention that
goes on between the creators of property rights ... and those who wish
to make some exploitation of those rights," .... then nothing has changed
but the rhetoric.
C. APPROACHING "PERFECT CONTROL"
Throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, a debate
raged between rival philosophers of copyright. On one side were those
who viewed rights in tangible human expression as fundamental, natural,
even "God-given .... ' On the other were those who viewed copyright as a
utilitarian construct of positive law."' Neither side was shy about making
its arguments, and neither side felt particularly bound by the literal
language of the Constitution, which gave Congress the power to
Io7. Hearings on H.R. 10434, supra note 85, at 23 ("We have been trying to get from 1885 on a
copyright statute that should be consistent with the principles of copyright, the main principle being to
give to the author and to his assignee the exclusive control of his property ".... ) (statement of George
Haven Putnam, Chairman, National Association of Book Publishers).
io8. Id. at 302 (describing a conference at which songwriters insisted upon "'control over [their]
compositions or mechanicals without any restriction"') (statement of Alfred L. Smith, General
Manager, Music Industries Chamber of Commerce); see also Discussion and Comments on Report of
the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of U.S. Copyright Law, 88th Cong. 255 (1963)
(complaining that "[alt present, certain rights are not granted; others are severely limited").
io9. General Revision of the Copyright Law, supra note 75, at io (noting that the "feeling that
authors have ... an inherent and natural right keeps cropping up all the time") (statement of Richard
C. De Wolf, Acting Assistant, Registry of Copyrights).
ito. Id.
Iii. Hearings on H.R. 6250 and H.R. 9137, supra note 64, at 119 (statement of Gene Buck,
President, American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers).
I12. See, e.g., Arguments on S. 633o and H.R. 19853 , supra note 5I, at 273 ("The whole copyright
theory is based, not upon the notion of inherent property right at all, but is based upon a convention of
civilization.") (statement of Albert H. Walker).
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''promote the Progress of Science ... by securing for limited Times to
Authors... the exclusive Right to their respective Writings.' . 3 As a
Member of Congress joked in 1906, "this is the 'Constitution between
friends,' you know.""..4 In the struggle to define the scope of the
"exclusive Right," and therefore the scope of the access right, "the
promotion of the progress of science and the useful arts, seemed-
unconsciously, of course-likely to be overcast."".5
The difference between the rival philosophies was most apparent
when the debate touched upon newly granted rights. Only a few years
after Congress granted songwriters the exclusive right of public
performance in 1897, the songwriters and their rivals, the phonograph
companies, held widely divergent opinions on how that right had come to
be. Songwriters and the music publishers to whom they assigned their
rights felt that Congress had acted to "restore" to the songwriter the
rights that "should already [have been] his.""..6 Phonograph companies,
for their part, argued that no such rights had existed until Congress had
conferred them. "[I]t is not [a] restoration," they argued, because
"[songwriters] never had any right; they are asking to take away
something from the phonograph companies."'I 7 The argument as to who,
exactly, was taking something from whom led to an interesting exchange
between Representative Sol Bloom and John Paine, a representative of
the Victor Talking Machine Company:
Mr. BLOOM. At the time the copyright law was passed the mechanical
records were not known; is that not the fact?
Mr. PAINE. You mean the old law of 189i?
Mr. BLOOM. Yes.
Mr. PAINE. That is right.
Mr. BLOOM. Then it was under that law that you took the right to use
these things [i.e., songs]?
Mr. PAINE. It is just splitting hairs as to whether we took [the right] or
whether we had it; one man will say one thing and another man will say
the other."
8
It was more than just "splitting hairs," of course. If, in the absence of
legislation, songwriters had the right to prevent others from performing
113. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
114. Arguments on S. 6330 and H.R. 19853, supra note 51, at 105 (statement of Rep. Chaney).
I15. S. REP. No. 42-409, at (1873).
116. Arguments on S. 6330 and H.R. 19853, supra note 51, at 229 (statement of J. L. Tindale).
117. Hearings on H.R. 11258, supra note 59, at 373-74 (statement of Arthur E. Garmaize,
representing Columbia Phonograph Co.); see also id. at 375 ("They [Congress] considered it was a
right that the music publisher never had, and they did not want to create it.... [I]t was not a natural
right.").
118. Id. at 330 (statement of J. G. Paine, representing Victor Talking Machine Co.).
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their songs, then that right must have flowed from nature herself. And if
that were the case, then any statute that failed to give creators control
over their creations would contravene this natural law." 9
If Congress was sympathetic to this philosophy in the early years of
the twentieth century, as time passed, the Supreme Court increasingly
was of the view that copyright law existed for a more public purpose. In
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, decided in 1932, the Court wrote that "[t]he
sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the
monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the
labors of authors.".. In Mazer v. Stein, decided in 1954, the Court went
further, characterizing "reward to the [copyright] owner" as "a secondary
consideration," although it did observe that "encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare .... ' And in 1975, the Court decided Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, in which the Court ignored its own contrary precedent to
hold that the owner of a chicken restaurant had not engaged in a public
performance when he played the radio for the benefit of his patrons.'2
According to the Aiken Court, "private motivation must ultimately serve
the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and
the other arts." 23
The language in these decisions (and in particular, in Mazer) soon
was reflected in the rhetoric by which creators sought rights under the
Copyright Act,'24 of which Congress began to consider a wholesale
revision in 1955.25 To be sure, creators continued to speak the language
of labor theory, arguing, for example, that "if a man produces something,
it is his."' 2' But they also began to speak of their "economic incentive"-
ri9. As Elizabeth Janeway of the Authors League of America testified in 1967, for example,
"These [the exclusive rights to publish, perform, broadcast, and otherwise present his work] are
fundamental rights to which he [the author] is entitled under the Constitution and at common law."
Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 597 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and
Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 9oth Cong. 34 (1967) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 597]
(statement of Elizabeth Janeway, Authors League of America).
120. 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
121. 347 U.S. 20I, 219 (1954).
122. 422 U.S. 151, 16o-6i (1975).
123. Id. at 156.
124. See, e.g., Copyright Law Revision, Part 5, 1964 Revision Bill with Discussions and Comments,
House Comm. Print, 89th Cong. 358 (1964) ("I might suggest that Mr. Rosenfield read Justice Reed's
opinion in the Mazer case, where he ends up by saying that the interest of the United States, the
public, lies in giving to the author an incentive to devote his efforts to authorship-and, as he said, that
stimulant may be in the form of a monetary incentive.") (statement of John Schulman).
125. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 47 (1976); Litman, supra note 14, at 872.
126. Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 568o, H.R. 6831, and H.R. 6835, supra note 92, at 1i5i
(statement of Larston D. Farrar); see also id. at 1152 ("[T]he study, research, and intelligence and
mental skills required of a commercial writer, on almost any level, certainly entitle him to greater
compensation than the manual labor of a janitor,...").
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"always," of course, "with due regard for the public interest.' 2. In 1961,
for example, a witness testified to a "growing awareness that the real
public interest lies not in the legal right to copy what another has done,
but rather, in every right stimulus to progress through creativity...2.
According to creators, that stimulus could be had only through
"adequate copyright protection"' 9
- and creators believed themselves to
be in the best position to determine what was adequate. Not surprisingly,
this "adequate" amount of protection soon bore a striking resemblance
to the protection to which creators had argued they were entitled under
natural law. As Rex Stout, President of the Authors League of America,
testified in 1965:
We believe that.., an author who creates something of value is
entitled to enjoy the fruits of his labor; that this is accomplished.. . by
securing to him the exclusive rights in his creation...; that by securing
these rights we provide the incentive for independent literary creation;
and that all of us. . .will reap the benefits .... "'
Creators had not ceased to believe in the "fundamental rights to
which [they were] entitled under the Constitution and at common law"; ' '
they simply began to speak the language of "the public's interest in
copyright," which they argued was "served by adequate copyright
protection," which protection consisted of rights that were as exclusive as
possible.'32 To quote Rex Stout, "If [the copyright] is diluted by
exceptions that permit uses to be made of [the author's] work without his
consent and compensation, incentive and reward for creative effort are
diminished, and society is deprived of its most effective means of
encouraging and aiding the creation of... works."'33 Arguments like
these seemed to resonate with lawmakers. Representative John
Monaghhan, for one, could "think of no more practical way to stimulate
artists and authors than to protect the fundamental rights of those who
127. Id. at 1407 (statement of Stanley Ballard, American Federation of Musicians).
128. Copyright Law Revision, Part 2, Discussions and Comments on Report of the Register of
Copyrights on the Gen'l Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law, 88th Cong. 378 (1963) [hereinafter
Copyright Law Revision, Part 2] (statement of John R. Peterson).
129. See Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, and H.R. 6835, supra note 92, at 237 ("The
history of copyright... demonstrate[s] (if formal demonstration is needed) that only by reason of
adequate copyright protection will creativity be increased.") (statement of Burton Lane, American
Guild of Authors & Composers).
130. Id. at 96 (statement of Rex Stout, Authors League of America); see also Hearings. on S. 597,
supra note 119, at 34 ("The best way to keep [the author] productive and to insure his contribution to
the public welfare is to let him receive a return on the values he produces.") (statement of Elizabeth
Janeway, Authors League of America).
131. Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 568o, H.R. 6831, and H.R. 6835, supra note 92, at 82 (statement
of Rex Stout, Authors League of America); see also id. at 95 (characterizing "the revision bill" as "the
most decisive step Congress could take to encourage the creative arts... [for it would more
effectively protect the fundamental rights of the creators of our works of literature and art").
132. Id. at 82.
133. Id.
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produce novels, plays, and poems.' 1 34 And when, in 1976, Congress
succeeded in revising the Copyright Act, the Register of Copyrights,
Barbara Ringer, described the new law as one that identified copyright
more closely with creators than publishers, "mark[ing] a break with a
two-hundred-year-old tradition."'35
In 1965, Larston Farrar testified that while it "might be 20 or 30
years,... I deeply believe that the writer should be paid for every use
just as I say the electric company is paid every time we flip a light on."' 36
If copyright now enables copyright owners to exercise this kind of
"perfect control,"' 37 then changes in technology are partly responsible,
for technology aids in the "creation and maintenance of an efficient...
literary market"'', in which every use is metered. But the impulse to use
technology for this purpose resides in the minds of creators, as evidenced
by the rhetoric of expectation with which creators have justified their
demands for greater rights: Creators expect to enjoy rights "as good" as
others do; they expect to enjoy "better" rights over time, as others have
in the past; and in the end, they expect their works to belong to them
absolutely. When Congress acts to provide creators with the rewards
they expect, so as to safeguard their incentives to create, the result is a
circularity of expectation that leads inexorably to an increase in
exclusivity-unless, of course, lawmakers intervene to "break the
circle.' 39
II. CIRCULARITIES OF EXPECTATION
The law is no stranger to circularities, many of which revolve around
expectations, and in particular, around the rights that people expect the
law to afford them. The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence arguably is one of these. In Katz v.
United States, the United States Supreme Court held that a person is the
subject of a search, thus triggering the warrant requirement, if his
"reasonable expectation of privacy" is invaded by law enforcement.'4" In
134- Id. at 1104 (statement of Rep. John S. Monagan).
135. N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 495 n.3 (2001) (quoting Barbara Ringer, First
Thoughts on the Copyright Act of 1976, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 477. 490 (1977)); accord Mills Music,
Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 173 n.40 (1985); id. at 186 n.17 (White, J., dissenting).
136. Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 568o, H.R. 6831, and H.R. 6835, supra note 92, at 1155
(statement of Larston D. Farrar, Farrar Publishing Co.).
137. Lessig, supra note 8, at 638.
138. Hearings Before Committee on House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and
Intellectual Property, 1o9th Cong. (2oo6) (statement of Paul Aiken, Authors Guild), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/aikeno329o6.pdf.
139. See supra note 35.
140. 389 U.S. 347, 36o-6I (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). This may sound reasonable enough, but
as a tautology, it does not make for much of a test: "[T]hose 'actual (subjective) expectation[s] of
privacy' 'that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable,' bear an uncanny resemblance to those
expectations of privacy that this Court considers reasonable." Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97
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adopting this test, the Court seems to have assumed that what people
reasonably expect, in terms of privacy, is an objective fact that has its
own existence, separate from the reach of the law. In reality, however,
the law shapes expectations in profound ways-and vice versa. "Our
expectations.., are in large part reflections of laws that translate into
rules the customs... of the past and present," and as a result, the law not
only "mirror[s] and reflect[s]," it "form[s] and project[s]. ' ''4' For Justice
Harlan, who wrote these words in United States v. White,'42 the danger in
holding that White reasonably should have expected his friend to be
''wearing a wire" for the federal government was precisely that the rest
of us would come to expect such a thing. If White had any impact on our
expectations (and if nothing else, police dramas on television suggest that
it did), we indeed have come to expect that anyone with whom we speak
could be bugged by the government, even when the government lacks
the evidence to justify the issuance of a warrant. To speak is to take the
risk. A contrary expectation has become unreasonable, and our Fourth
Amendment rights have shrunk to fit our diminished expectations.
Anyone who persists in believing in "more" privacy than this is, by
definition, unreasonable to expect it.
A similar circularity exists in the test for whether the government
has engaged in a Fifth Amendment "taking." Absent the operation of a
per se rule, a government action challenged as a taking under the Fifth
Amendment is subject to a rule of reason that inquires into a number of
factors, including the extent to which the action has interfered with any
''reasonable investment-backed expectations" the property owner may
have entertained when he took title to the property.'43 As Justice
Kennedy pointed out in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,'"
however, "if the owner's reasonable expectations are shaped by what
courts allow as a proper exercise of governmental authority, property
(1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361). In other words, after Katz, an
expectation of privacy is reasonable if a court says it is, and thus a search has been conducted if a court
says it has. But see Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REv. 8oi, 8o9 (2001) ("In most contexts, whether an
expectation of privacy is deemed reasonable can be answered by whether it is backed by what I will
call a 'loose' version of real property law. Under these precedents, a 'reasonable expectation of
privacy' is not the same as the privacy that a reasonable person would expect. Instead, it acts as a term
of art tied largely to traditional property law concepts.").
141. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745,786 (I971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
142. Id.
143. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 6o6, 617-18, 626 (2oo0); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, Ioi6 n.7 (1992); id. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring). But defining Fifth Amendment
rights by reference to what property owners reasonably expect is tautological. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S.
at 626 (zooI) ("So, the argument goes, by prospective legislation the State can shape and define
property rights and reasonable investment-backed expectations, and subsequent owners cannot claim
any injury from lost value. After all, they purchased or took title with notice of the limitation.").
144. 505 U.S. 1003.
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tends to become what courts say it is.'''45 If, over time, courts find fewer
"investment-backed expectations" to be reasonable, then property
owners are likely, over time, to view their property rights as more limited
than they were before-which, in turn, means that their rights are more
limited, for property rights depend, in part, on what property owners
reasonably expect those rights to be.
When legal rules define rights by reference to the expectations of
rights-holders, lawmakers can use those rules to narrow rights by
conditioning rights-holders to lower their expectations. Courts are not in
a particularly good position to break this cycle because their role is to
apply the rules, not to make them. Accordingly, when presented with
evidence of lower expectations among rights-holders, courts are perfectly
justified in giving rights-holders the rights they expect-thus narrowing
rights even further. In this way does the law "form and project," "mirror
and reflect,"'' 6 in a cycle of signals sent and received.
To be sure, copyright law does not define the rights of creators by
asking, explicitly, about their expectations of reward. But even if the
circularity at the heart of copyright law is more subtle than the ones
discussed above, it does exist. So far as creators are concerned, this
circularity of expectation operates to broaden rights instead of narrowing
them, and to raise expectations instead of lowering them. It does so by
using the "one-way ratchet" of inducement,'47 by which lawmakers locate
the boundaries of copyright by asking whether more rights would
provide creators with more incentives to create. And as Professor Litman
has pointed out, if the question for lawmakers is "whether an increase in
copyright protection [would] lead to the production of more or better
works of authorship," "[t]he answer to that question is always yes. '4
A. BROADENING RIGHTS BY RAISING EXPECTATIONS
There are a number of circularities in copyright law, ranging from
the obvious to the subtle. Perhaps the most obvious of these is the
infringement test known as "substantial similarity." In order to prove a
claim of infringement, the copyright owner must show that the defendant
has engaged in wrongful appropriation of protectable expression.'49 The
copyright owner proves wrongful appropriation, in turn, by showing a
substantial similarity between the accused work and protectable portions
145. Id. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
146. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745,786 (I97I) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
147. Litman, supra note so, at 344.
548. Id.
149. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) (instructing that "[i]f copying is
established, then only does there arise the second issue, that of... unlawful appropriation" and in
addressing that issue, asking "whether defendant took from plaintiff's works so much of what is
pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience for whom such popular music is
composed, that defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff").
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of the copyrighted work.'50 In evaluating substantial similarity, the trier of
fact asks whether the "average lay observer would recognize the alleged
copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work."''5 ' Thus,
"appropriation" is part of the question and the answer: In determining
whether something has been appropriated, the trier of fact (acting as
''average lay observer") decides whether something has been
appropriated.
Other circularities in copyright are more subtle. Consider the fair
use defense: in determining whether an accused use is fair, courts balance
four statutory factors, including "the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.' 52 It is easy to see why this
factor is relevant; if a defendant engages in a use that "prejudice[s] the
sale, or diminish[es] the profits, or supersede[s] the objects, of the
original work,"'53 that use promises to diminish the profits the original
author expects to receive, thus diminishing his incentives to create-if,
indeed, he is motivated by profit in the first place.'54 In practice, though,
once courts start looking for harm to this "potential market,"'55 they need
not look any further than the infringement itself. If a defendant has used
the copyrighted work in a particular market without paying for a license
(thus engaging in infringement), that market not only is a "potential" one
for the purposes of the fair use inquiry, but that market clearly has
suffered an "effect." As Professor Nimmer has explained,
150. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S.
902 093).
151. Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966).
152. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2oo0).
153. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
154. See S. REP. No. 49-H t88, at 83 (1886) (statement of Roger Sherman):
Take the real author, the man who was ordained by God to write, who has genius and the
grand afflatus which was put into his head. He has got to write, just as a singing bird has to
sing; he cannot help it. You may pass all your copyright laws to prevent him, but he will do
it; he has got something to say.
155. In weighing this fourth factor, courts consider "not only the extent of market harm caused by
the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but also 'whether unrestricted and widespread conduct
of the sort engaged in by the defendant.., would result in a substantially adverse impact on the
potential market' for the original." Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 51o U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (quoting
NIMMER, supra note 9, § 13.05[A][4]) (other citations omitted). Courts also search not only for "harm
to the original [market] but also [for] harm to the market for derivative works"-even derivative
markets that the copyright owner never dreamed of exploiting. Id.; accord Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985). With enough imagination, judges can find harm in
almost any use, however remote from the market from the original work. Indeed, judges increasingly
are finding that even beneficial uses-i.e., uses that increase the market for the original work-are
unfair simply because they deprive copyright owners of another licensing opportunity. See Campbell,
510 U.S. at 59o n.21 ("Even favorable evidence, without more, is no guarantee of fairness." (citing
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 1O3 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1124 n.84 (i99O))); A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, loi8 (9th Cir. 2001) ("We agree that increased sales of
copyrighted material attributable to unauthorized use should not deprive the copyright holder of the
right to license the material.").
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[H]ow can one prove a potential without simply degenerating into the
tautology that [the] defendant occupied a certain niche, which itself
proves a potential market to exist and to have been usurped? More
pointedly, how can the defendant, who after all bears the burden of
proof on the fair use affirmative defense, negate that tautology?"'
Once copyright owners know that they can "fence in" derivative
markets simply by exploiting their works in those markets, they can
move the fence-and broaden their rights-simply by creating more
markets in which to exercise their exclusivity. And by making it easy to
take a license in those markets, copyright owners increasingly have
redefined an "unfair use" as an unlicensed one."7 In American
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc.," for example, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals was asked to consider whether Texaco had engaged in
a fair use when it facilitated the wholesale copying of scientific articles
that its scientists used to educate themselves. Educative uses are
classically "fair," and the authors of the copied articles had engaged in
creation not for monetary reward, but "just [for] the reward of being
published.""' 9 In the end, though, the court rejected the fair use defense
on the grounds that: (a) "a viable market for licensing these rights for
individual journal articles" existed in the Copyright Clearance Center;
(b) Texaco could have purchased such a license; and (c) Texaco failed to
do so.' 6 In other words, Texaco had impacted a market for the journal
articles because there was such a market, and it had suffered an impact.
In reaching its holding, the court acknowledged "[tihe vice of circular
reasoning," but noted that it arose "only if the availability of payment is
conclusive against fair use.' I6' But there is no indication that the court
saw it any other way. 162
156. NIMMER, supra note 9, § 13.05[A][4].
157. In an interesting variation on this theme, Professor James Gibson has revealed how risk
aversion among potential licensees (who take "unneeded" licenses) has made this circularity even
more pernicious:
This practice of unneeded licensing feeds back into doctrine through one final
uncontroversial premise: the fair use defense looks to the existence vel non of a licensing
market when defining the reach of the copyright entitlement. The result is a steady,
incremental, unintended expansion of copyright, caused by nothing more than ambiguous
doctrine and prudent behavior on the part of copyright users.
James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, I16 YALE L.J.
(forthcoming 2007).
158. 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
159. Id. at 927.
16o. Id. at 930. Compare the test for infringement, which asks, in essence, whether the defendant
engaged in the act of copying without securing a license. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d
Cir. 1946) (listing "two separate elements" of an infringement action: "(a) that defendant copied from
plaintiff's copyrighted work[;] and (b) that the copying (assuming it to be proved) went so far as to
constitute improper appropriation").
16r. Am. Geophysical Union, 6o F.3d at 931.
162. This reasoning has crept into other judicial opinions as well. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v.
Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1387 (6th Cir. 1996). As a consequence, one might
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The impact of the circular reasoning in Texaco is not confined to the
defense of fair use, to the offense of infringement, or even to the
adjudication of these issues in the courts. More broadly, that reasoning
creates what computer scientists might term a "feedback loop" of market
definition, exploitation, and capture: (i) enterprising licensors (and
licensees) create or discover a new market for copyrighted works;
(2) creators learn of that market; (3) some of those creators form
expectations of exploiting their works in that market (or related
markets); (4) those expectations become the bases of incentives to
create; (5) Congress enters to safeguard those incentives by providing
creators with exclusivity in the expected markets; (6) the courts enforce
that exclusivity; and (7) the process repeats itself until "a terminating
condition is reached."'
What most scholars have failed to recognize is that this circularity
rests on the interaction between what creators expect and what motivates
them to create-that is, between expectations and incentives. Because
incentives are so central to copyright law, this circularity is absolutely
pervasive. If Congress grants exclusivity (or not) depending on whether
creators have adequate incentives to create, giving creators the power to
weigh the adequacy of their incentives gives them the power to set the
boundaries of copyright law. Providing creators with more rights raises
their expectations of reward which, in turn, raises the quantum of
exclusivity thought to be necessary to induce them to create. Further, if
Congress regularly increases this dose of exclusivity, then creators come
to expect regular increases, which causes them to calibrate their
incentives accordingly. Thus do rights flow from incentives flow from
expectations flow from rights, ad infinitum.
B. "THE SLUGABED AUTHOR" AND "His GRANDCHILDREN'S
GRANDCHILDREN" 64
Professor Benkler has proposed to assign to courts the role of
reasonably wonder: does anything remain of the fair use defense? "Transformative" uses are en vogue,
but even the transformation test is tricky. Compare, e.g., Leval, supra note 155, at IIsI ("I believe the
answer to the question of justification turns primarily on whether, and to what extent, the challenged
use is transformative. The use must be productive and must employ the quoted matter in a different
manner or for a different purpose from the original."), with 17 U.S.C. § io6 (20o0) (giving copyright
owners the "exclusive rights to... prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work."). See
also id. § ioi (defining "derivative work" as "a work based upon one or more preexisting works...
[and taking] any... form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.").
163. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.m-w.com (defining "loop" as "a
series of instructions (as for a computer) that is repeated until a terminating condition is reached")
(last visited Jan. 4, 2007). That terminating condition might be a revolution; or, as some have argued, it
might be the death of creation itself. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE
COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 234-39 (2001); Lunney, supra note 7, at 813.
164- See Jane C. Ginsburg et al., The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How Long is
Too Long?, i8 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651,677 (2ooo) (remarks of Wendy Gordon).
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"backstop" against the "political economy" that has led to such a
"systematic and excessive expansion of exclusive rights."' 65
Unfortunately, however, the rhetoric at the heart of that expansion has
made a judicial solution exceedingly unlikely (if not impossible) to
achieve, given the role of courts in our system of government. The case
of Eldred v. Ashcroft,'66 and the legislative demands that preceded it,
together provide a perfect study of the problem. In Eldred, the Supreme
Court was asked to decide whether Congress acted unconstitutionally in
adding twenty years to existing and future terms of copyright. For the
Court, taking the case meant joining the debate over duration, which the
House of Representatives has observed is "as old as the oldest copyright
statute and will doubtless continue as long as there is a copyright law.'
6
,
Congress itself had joined the debate more than once, and more than
once it had extended the term of copyright-most recently as part of the
Copyright Act of 1976. Until it decided Eldred, however, the Court had
not tackled the issue of duration in copyright law. As it was to learn, the
issue had a considerable weight of history and rhetoric behind it.
The issue of duration long has , roduced a sharp division between
the rival philosophers of copyright.' The utilitarians cited the phrase
"limited Times" in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution as
evidence that copyright was not a natural right, but one to be granted (or
not) by Congress.'69 The natural rightists, for their part, believed that if
copyrights truly were "founded in nature," then those rights should
endure forever.' 70 Mark Twain was an adherent of this philosophy; in
1906, he argued that the copyright in a work "should be the property of
that man and his heirs forever and ever," as a coal mine might be.'
When Twain was informed that the Constitution prohibited the grant of
a perpetual copyright, he resisted: "I know that we must have that limit,"
he testified. "But forty-two years is too much of a limit. I do not know
why there should be a limit at all. I am quite unable to guess why there
165. Benkler, supra note 21, at 197.
166. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
167. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 133 (1976).
16& See generally LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (Jeffery M.
Samuels ed., 1968).
169. See Hearings on H.R. 6458 and H.R. 13618, supra note 64, at 133:
[Creators] have repeatedly expostulated that a man has a right to the product of his ability,
such as it is .... I think, perhaps, that is an error, because if he had such a natural or divine
right Government would not limit the time which it gives him for the exercise of that right.
(statement of George C. Shields).
170. See H.R. REP. No. 21-4o93, at 2 (1830) ("Upon the first principles of proprietorship in
property, an author has an exclusive and perpetual right, in preference to any other, to the fruits of his
labor. Though the nature of literary property is peculiar, it is not the less real and valuable.").
171. Arguments on S. 633o and H.R. 19853, supra note 51, at 119-20 (statement of Samuel L.
Clemens).
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should be a limit to the possession of the product of a man's labor."'72
When, from time to time, creators conceded the propriety of limiting the
duration of copyright, they urged Congress to withhold that limit for as
long as possible: as Boston publisher Nahum Capen put it, "Although we
are in favor of perpetual rights, when founded in nature; still, if the good
of society requires their abridgment, let them be abridged: but, in the
name of justice, trespass no farther."'73
In seeking to limit that trespass, creators urged Congress to take
notice of the length of copyright terms in Europe, for as in other
respects, American creators wished to enjoy rights "as good" as others
did. As we have seen, Congress extended the copyright term for the first
time, in 1831, because it wished to place American authors "more nearly
upon an equality with authors in other countries.""'7 But that equality did
not last. By the turn of the twentieth century, most European countries
had become parties to the Berne Convention, and as a result, most
European creators enjoyed a copyright term enduring for their lives and
fifty years after their deaths.'75 American creators asked Congress to
provide them with a similar term in I9o6,, 6 but Congress declined to do
172. Id. at 116 (statement of Samuel L. Clemens); accord S. REP. No. 49-1188, at. 43 (1886)
(statement of James Russell Lowell):
Mr. LOWELL. I think I said we [authors] were entitled to our property in our books. I do
not concede that you are entitled to limit us to forty-two years. But as you are stronger than
I am, I give it up.
Senator CHASE. We are limited in that manner by the Constitution.
Mr. LOWELL. Well, the Constitution has several times yielded where there has been a
difference of opinion.
173. MEMORIAL OF NAHUM CAPEN, OF BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, ON THE SUBJECT OF INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT, H.R. Doc. No. 28-61, at 4 (I844). Perhaps in response to arguments like these, a "very
famous Senator" proposed "as late as I9OO" that copyrights endure for a thousand years. General
Revision of the Copyright Law, supra note 75, at 466 (statement of M.L. Raney). As the proposal "was
quickly seen to be in opposition to the spirit of the Constitution," however, "they got nowhere with it,
not even out of committee." Id.; accord Hearings on H.R. 10434, supra note 85, at 146 ("When you can
not quote Kipling[']s 'If' in a school reader till he is a half century gone, copyright has been abused.
They are always trying to stretch the term. A bill was actually introduced in the senate, in i9oo, fixing
it at a thousand years!") (statement of M.L. Raney).
174. H.R. REP. No. 21-3, at I(1830); id. (noting that "for the most obvious reasons, the United
States ought to be foremost among nations in encouraging science and literature, by securing the fruits
of intellectual labor," but that "she is, in this thing, very far behind them all, as a reference to their
laws will show"); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 236 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting); supra
note 73 and accompanying text.
175. See Berne Convention, supra note 86, Art. 7() ("The term of protection granted by this
Convention shall be the life of the author and fifty years after his death.").
176. In 19o6, the idea that such a term might qualify as a "limited Time" was dismissed by some as
absurd:
Let us assume that Mark Twain, if he were 80 years of age, were to write a book. He has his
daughter, who may be 20, write a few lines in that same book. Mark Twain dies in a few
years; she lives to be 90. There is seventy years of copyright, and fifty years after her death,
making one hundred and twenty years. I do not believe that that is a "limited time" within
the meaning of the phraseology of the Constitution. [Laughter.]
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so as part of the Copyright Act of I909,'" which instead gave creators an
initial term of twenty-eight years, renewable for twenty-eight more years,
for a total of fifty-six."" Notwithstanding this setback, American creators
did not abandon their efforts to achieve parity with Europeans (and
increasingly, the rest of the "Western World").'79 In 1965, as Congress
began in earnest to consider another revision of the Copyright Act, Rex
Stout stated the case for a term extension most succinctly: "Under the
revision bill," he testified, "copyright on an individual author's works
would last for his life and fifty years after his death. This is the copyright
term in most Western countries. It should be adopted."'' " For Stout and
others, the task simply was to put American creators "in a compatible
position.•"8,
Creators also justified their demands for a longer term of copyright
by adjusting their rhetoric to reflect the rise of the incentive theory, as
evidenced by the language in cases like Mazer v. Stein.8's For these new
"utilitarians," a copyright term based on the life of the author was not
simply what creators deserved; it was what society deserved. As Morton
Schaeffer put it in 1963, "We can produce the greatest amount of activity
among the creative artists by giving them something to work for during
their lifetimes, and by giving something to their families after the
authors' deaths.""'8 For creators, "the importance of long-term copyright
protection in encouraging creative contributions" simply outweighed
other values, such as "providing an additional body of public domain
material" for use by others.'8' Indeed, for creators, this
"encourag[ement]" outweighed everything else. If, after Mazer, "'reward
Arguments on S. 6330 and H.R. 19853, supra note 51, at 53 (statement of George W. Ogilvie).
177. Act of Mar. 4, I909, ch. 320,35 Stat. 1075.
178. Id. § 23.
I79. See Copyright Law Revision, Part 2, supra note 128, at 383 ("[W]e believe that we should not
in this matter [of duration] be out of line with the rest of the Western World, which does not typically
have an original and renewal period but rather one period measured by the life of the author plus a
specified term of years.") (statement of Harriet F. Pilpel and Morton David Goldberg dated May 22,
1961).
18o. Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 568o, H.R. 6831, and H.R. 6835, supra note 92, at 96 (statement
of Rex Stout, Authors League of America).
181. Copyright Law Revision, Part 4, supra note 94, at 28 (statement of Morton Schaeffer dated
Aug. 15, 1963) ("I believe, however, that because the European countries and most of the rest of the
world have life-and-fifty years, we should put ourselves in a compatible position."); accord Copyright
Law Revision, Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, and H.R. 6835, supra note 92, at 242
(citing a comparative study of duration and concluding that "the term of copyright in this country
should also be for the lifetime of the author plus 50 years") (statement of Leon Kellman, American
Guild of Authors & Composers dated May 27, 1965).
182. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
183. Copyright Law Revision, Part 4, supra note 94, at 28 (statement of Morton Schaeffer dated
Aug. 15, 1963).
184. Copyright Law Revision, Part 2, supra note 128, at 383 (statement of Harriet F. Pilpel and
Morton David Goldberg dated May 22, 1961).
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to the [copyright] owner" was "a secondary consideration, ' '' ..5 creators
made it known that individual reward was the prime mover of the
machinery of incentive and thus the "progress of Science. ' '86 To quote
Irwin Karp, counsel to the Authors League of America, "[tihe period of
protection provided by life-plus-50 is a reasonable and necessary method
of accomplishing this Constitutional purpose. '
By 1976, Congress seems to have agreed with this assessment. In
section 302 of the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress for the first time
provided creators with a copyright "term consisting of the life of the
author and fifty years after the author's death.' 88 "The need for a longer
total term of copyright" was, for Congress, "conclusively
demonstrated"'" by means of several arguments, many of which creators
had made for decades. First, Congress was concerned that some creators
did not enjoy the same rights as others did: not only was "[a] short
term... particularly discriminatory against serious works of music,
literature, and art,"'" but a term of years also threatened to subject
American creators to discrimination by foreign countries, "[a] very large
majority" of which had long since "adopted a copyright term of the life
of the author and 50 years after the author's death.' 9' In short, Congress
noted, "[n]o country in the world has provisions on the duration of
copyright like ours,"'' 92 which deficiency it proposed to correct. Second,
while Congress questioned the "fair[ness]" of a shorter term, it chose to
emphasize the utility of a longer one, the advantages of which it held to
"outweigh any possible disadvantages" to the public.93 Congress clearly
believed the interests of the public to lie in the encouragement of more
creation (and thus the grant of broader rights).'94 Yet even the public
interest in access was cited in support of extension. As Congress
observed, "[i]n some cases the lack of copyright protection actually
185. 347 U.S. at 219 (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)).
i86. U.S. CONsT. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
187. Copyright Law Revision Part i: Hearings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 354 (1975)
(statement of Irwin Karp, Counsel, Authors League of America).
188. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 302, 90 Stat. 2541, 2572-73 (codified as amended
at 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000)).
189. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 135 (1976).
19o. Id. at 134.
191. Id. at 135; see also id. ("Since American authors are frequently protected longer in foreign
countries than in the United States, the disparity in the duration of copyright has provoked
considerable resentment and some proposals for retaliatory legislation.").
192. Id.
193. Id.; see also id. at 134 ("Although limitations on the term of copyright are obviously
necessary, too short a term harms the author without giving any substantial benefit to the public.").
194. As for the public benefit to be gained by the use of copyrighted works, Congress noted that
"the bill would not restrain scholars from using any work as source material or from making 'fair use'
of it"; instead, "the restrictions would extend only to ... use[s] that would actually infringe the
copyright owner's exclusive rights." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 136 (1976).
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restrains dissemination of the work, since publishers and other users
cannot risk investing in the work unless assured of exclusive rights."'95
Once again, broader rights (and increased control) were thought to be
the answer.
Congress revisited these arguments when it enacted the Copyright
Term Extension Act of I998,' 9 which added twenty years to existing and
future terms of copyright."9 In the two decades since the passage of the
Copyright Act of 1976, none of the justifications for a longer term had
changed; if anything, they had become more convincing. In 1995, the
European Union had directed member states to extend the term of
copyright by twenty years, producing a term of "life plus 70,"'98 and as
the House noted in its Report, it foresaw "profound effects for the
United States if it [did] not extend [the] copyright term as well."' 99 Nor
had anything happened to change the calculus of incentive. As it had in
1976, Congress found in 1998 that "[e]xtending copyright protection will
be an incentive for U.S. authors to continue using their creativity to
produce works,"" thus reinforcing the relationship between the breadth
of rights granted and the incentives those rights were thought to create.20 '
By 1998, the Supreme Court had recognized this relationship too,
thus planting the seed that would become the majority opinion in Eldred
v. Ashcroft. °2 In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
the Court held for the accused infringer, repeating the orthodoxy that
"the ultimate aim [of copyright law] is ... to stimulate artistic creativity
for the general public good., 23 Within a few years, however, courts (and
scholars) began to confine the holding in Sony to its facts, choosing
instead to emphasize the language in the dissent, in which Justice
Blackmun accused the majority of "eroding the very basis of copyright
law, by depriving authors of control over their works and consequently of
195. Id. at 134.
196. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1988).
197. Id. § 102(b).
t98. See Council Directive 93/98, Harmonizing the Term of Protection of Copyright and Certain
Related Rights, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9, 9-11 (EC).
199. H.R. REP. No. 105-452, at 4 (1998).
200. Id. But see Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation: Hearings on
H.R. 989, H.R. 1248, and H.R. 1734 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, lo 4 th Cong. 420 (1995) ("I think it's a sham to try to hang on the theory that
we're creating incentives.") [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 989, H.R. 1248, and H.R. 1734] (statement
of Rep. Martin R. Hoke), cited in Brief for Petitioners at 42, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003)
(No. o1-618), 2002 WL 1041928.
201. See Litman, supra note Io, at 344 (noting that the "economic analysis," or incentives, model
"asks ... whether an increase in copyright protection will lead to the production of more or better
works of authorship" and observing that "[t]he answer to that question is always yes").
202. 537 U.S. 186.
203. 464 U.S. 47, 432 (1984).
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their incentive to create. 20 4 In 2001, this sentiment made its way into the
majority opinion in New York Times Co. v. Tasini,°5 in which Justice
Ginsburg made no mention of incentives, focusing exclusively on the
idea of'authorial right.2 6 When the Court granted certiorari in Eldred v.
Ashcroft"° a year later, the stage was set for the Court to assume the role
that history and rhetoric had prepared it to play: not, unfortunately, the
role of "backstop,''° but that of rubber stamp.
The difficulty would be in drawing lines. A century ago, a member of
Congress had asked a witness whether the copyright term was "not
primarily a legislative discretion rather than a judicial one ... even under
the Constitution?""° The witness had replied, "It is certainly legislative
discretion until it gets to be unconstitutional."'. Almost a century later in
Eldred, the Court believed it was being asked to hold that while a term
consisting of the life of the author plus fifty years was constitutional, "life
plus 70" was not."' This was a risky request to make; as Justice Breyer
observed during oral argument, if the Court implied that the duration
provisions of the Copyright Act of 1976 were unconstitutional, "the
chaos that would ensue would be horrendous ...... "Maybe," he suggested,
"we ought to find another theory. 1 13 But there was no other theory. If
most copyright scholars hoped that Eric Eldred would win the case, they
also knew (or should have known) that he would lose.
It was not as if anybody really believed that twenty more years
would provide creators with significant inducement. In a brief filed in
support of the petitioners, a group of distinguished economists informed
the Court that while "[tihe main economic benefit from copyright
204. Id. at 481 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
205. 533 U.S. 483 (2ooi).
206. Justice Ginsburg used the words "author" and "right" in the same sentence fourteen times,
including in her opening sentence: "This copyright case concerns the rights of freelance authors and a
presumptive privilege of their publishers." Id. at 487; accord Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555 (1985) ("The Copyright Act, which accords the copyright owner the 'right to
control the first public distribution' of his work, echo[e]s the common law's concern that the author or
copyright owner retain control throughout this critical stage." (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 62
(1976))).
207. 534 U.S. 1126 (2002).
208. See Benkler, supra note 21, at 197.
209. Arguments on S. 6330 and H.R. 19853, supra note 51, at 156 (statement of Arthur Steuart).
210. Id.
211. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 209-10 (2003) ("Critically, we again emphasize,
petitioners fail to show how the [Copyright Term Extension Act] crosses a constitutionally significant
threshold with respect to 'limited Times' that the 1831, 19o9, and 1976 Acts did not."). But see Brief
for Petitioners, supra note 20o, at 14 ("Nor do petitioners argue, as the Court of Appeals implied, that
'5o years are enough to 'promote ... Progress,' ... [but] a grant of 70 years is unconstitutional.'
Whether 50 years is enough, or 70 years too much, is not a judgment meet for this Court." (citing
Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2OO))).
212. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Eldred, 537 U.S. 186 (No. Ol-618), 2002 WL 31309203.
213. Id. at 7.
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protection is to give an author an incentive to create new works[,] [t]he
size of this economic incentive depends upon the 'present value' of
compensation, as anticipated by the author at the time of creation. ' ...4 In
considering the impact of the extension on incentives to create new
works," 5 and after making a few assumptions, 6 the economists estimated
that the addition of twenty years to the copyright term would provide
future creators with a paltry 0.33% increase in the present value of
compensation flowing from their copyrights." '7 This increase, in their
view, provided "at most a very small additional incentive for an
economically minded author of a new work."' 8
Justices Stevens and Breyer found these figures instructive, even if
the rest of the Court did not. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer
wrote at length about the role of incentives in a copyright law that exists
"not to 'provide a special private benefit,' but 'to stimulate artistic
creativity for the general public good,"' which good it accomplishes "by
'motivat[ing] the creative activity of authors' through 'the provision of a
special reward.""' '9 If this was the "traditional economic rationale" for
copyright, Justice Breyer found that "no one could reasonably conclude"
that the rationale justified a statute that "[would] not act as an economic
spur encouraging authors to create new works .... For creators of existing
works, he wrote, "the statute creates no economic incentive at all .... And
as for future works, Justice Breyer stated that "[n]o potential author can
reasonably believe that he has more than a tiny chance of writing a
classic that will survive commercially long enough for the copyright
214. Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, Eldred, 537
U.S. 186 (No. o1-618), 2002 WL 1041846.
215. Amici considered the impact on future creators because existing works, by definition, already
have been created (making "additional compensation to the producer.., simply a windfall" for those
works). Id. at 8. In taking this approach, the economists recognized:
[The] extension for existing works could in theory have an effect on creators of new works,
by creating an expectation that, in the future, Congress would extend copyright even more,
and that this extension would apply retroactively to existing works. The maximum impact
on incentives from this effect, however, is trivial because the current copyright term already
has nearly the same present value as an infinite copyright term.
Id.
216. See id. at 7 (assuming "a constant stream of revenues and a 7% interest rate").
217. Id. at 6.
218. Id. at 2.
219. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 245 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); accord Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 15I,
156 (I975)).
220. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 254.
221. Id.; accord id. at 240 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The reason for increasing the inducement to
create something new simply does not apply to an already-created work."); id. (observing that creators
of existing works "will receive the full benefit of the exclusive terms that were promised as an
inducement to their creativity, and have no equitable claim to increased compensation for doing
nothing more").
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extension to matter .... If, as amici had calculated, "a i% likelihood of
earning $ioo annually for 20 years, starting 75 years into the future,
[were] worth less than seven cents today," then "[w]hat potential
Shakespeare, Wharton, or Hemingway would be moved by such a
sum?" '223 Justice Breyer conceded that Congress had heard testimony of
increased incentives, but he refused to credit that testimony, writing: "A
rational legislature could not give major weight to an invisible, likely
nonexistent incentive-related effect.
4
It might, in fact, be reasonable to conclude that any marginal
incentives created by the extension would be so insignificant as to render
the legislation unconstitutional. Unfortunately, however, copyright law
does not require creators to be reasonable. What if that "tiny chance" of
reward did provide somebody, somewhere with the necessary motivation
to create? In a panel discussion held while Eldred was pending in the
district court, Professor Gordon asked whether "the slugabed author
[was] likely to stir any earlier at the thought of increasing the wealth of
his grandchildren's grandchildren-or the great-great-grandchildren of
the publisher to whom the copyright is assigned."'25 Clearly believing that
the answer was "no," she concluded by saying, "[i]f not, an
instrumentalist would oppose the extension. '2,6 And so she would. But
what if the promise of such a reward would cause "the slugabed
author.., to stir?""' 7 As Justice Ginsburg warned in her majority
opinion, let us not "understate[ ] the relationship between such rewards
and the 'Progress of Science.".. Congress had heard testimony from
creators (and their union representatives) who swore that twenty more
years of exclusivity would, in fact, give them more incentives to create, 9
and the Court refused to "take Congress to task for crediting this
evidence."'3 ° Indeed, the Court appeared to find that evidence
persuasive. Echoing the arguments that creators had made for years,
Justice Ginsburg compared creators of copyrightable works to their
222. Id. at 254 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 255.
224. Id. at 259; accord Benkler, supra note 21, at 199-200 (revealing the absurdity of arguments
that the Copyright Term Extension Act might increase incentives to create).
225. Ginsburg et al., supra note 164, at 677 (remarks of Wendy Gordon).
226. Id.
227. Id. But see Eldred, 537 U.S. at 255 (Breyer, J., dissenting):
[E]ven if this cited testimony... meant.., that somehow, somewhere, some potential
author might be moved by the thought of great-grandchildren receiving copyright royalties
a century hence, so might some potential author also be moved by the thought of royalties
being paid for two centuries, five centuries, i,ooo years, "'til the End of Time."
228. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212, n.18 (quoting U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8).
229. E.g., id. at 207 n.15 ("[E]xtending the copyright for existing works 'could ... provide
additional income that would finance the production and publication of new works."' (quoting
Hearings on H.R. 989, H.R. 1248, and H.R. 1734, supra note 200, at i58)).
230. Id.
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counterparts in Europe, "3 ' to inventors of patentable devices, '32 and even
to owners of real property.233 For Justice Ginsburg, as for Congress, as for
creators themselves, "[riewarding authors for their creative labor and
'promot[ing] ... Progress' [were] ... complementary. '234
Professor Lessig has described Justice Breyer's dissent in Eldred as
"perhaps the best opinion he has ever written.""'s Yet while the opinion
is both convincing and eloquent, it fails to address the unspoken question
at the heart of the case, and indeed, at the heart of copyright law: What
does it mean to provide creators with incentives? Is there, any longer, a
point at which incentives might be thought sufficient? If so, who gets to
decide when that point has been reached? Congress? The courts?
Creators, perhaps? In her majority opinion in Eldred, Justice Ginsburg
observed that "Congress heard testimony from a number of prominent
artists" who "expressed the belief that... fair compensation for
themselves and their heirs was an incentive to create. ' ' 36 Justice Breyer
took issue with this testimony, noting that it "amount[ed] to no more
than a set of undeniably true propositions about the value of incentives
in general."'37 But what about these incentives in particular?
In 1932, M.L. Raney testified that the "idea of perpetual copyright
has been very slow dying, ' '138 and indeed, in 1995, when the Register of
Copyrights, Marybeth Peters, held a hearing on the legislation that would
become the Copyright Term Extension Act, she observed that "[t]he
Songwriters Guild suggested a perpetual term." '39 So far as the issue of
duration is concerned, creators long have expected to enjoy a perpetual
term of copyright as their "fair compensation" for engaging in the act of
creation. If creators form incentives accordingly, must Congress satisfy
those incentives, and must the courts validate the result? If, as Justice
Ginsburg suggested,24 the answer is "yes," then not only have we given
231. Id. at 205-06 ("By extending the baseline United States copyright term to life plus 70 years,
Congress sought to ensure that American authors would receive the same copyright protection in
Europe as their European counterparts.").
232. Id. at 201 ("We count it significant that early Congresses extended the duration of numerous
individual patents as well as copyrights.").
233. Id. at 210 n.17 ("Under [the rule against perpetuities], the period before a bequest vests could
easily equal or exceed the anticipated average copyright term under the [Copyright Term Extension
Act].").
234. Id. at 212 n.i8.
235. Lawrence Lessig, How I Lost the Big One, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Mar./Apr. 2004, at 63.
236. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 207 n15.
237. Id. at 255 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
238. General Revision of the Copyright Law, supra note 75, at 466 (statement of M.L. Raney).
239. Hearings on H.R. 989, H.R. 1248, and H.R. 1734, supra note 200, at 230, quoted in Eldred, 537
U.S. at 206 n.55.
240. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222 ("The wisdom of Congress' action, however, is not within our province
to second-guess. Satisfied that the legislation before us remains inside the domain the Constitution
assigns to the First Branch, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.").
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Congress carte blanche on the subject of copyright,24 ' but we also have
made it almost impossible to identify what is wrong with the result.
C. APPEALING TO "BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES"
In other areas of the law, courts have sought escape from the subtle
circularities of expectation by searching for sources of law that they
believe to reside outside the circle, making those sources more objective
and thus more predictable."' Consider the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test under the Fourth Amendment: when asked in Kyllo v.
United States to decide whether thermal imaging of a residence was a
search, Justice Stevens, in dissent, was content to reside in the circularity,
concluding that "[a] subjective expectation that [the thermal evidence]
would remain private is... surely not 'one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable.'2 '43 But how did he know? That question
appeared to trouble Justice Scalia who, in writing for the majority,
sought to escape the relativity of expectation by searching for an outside
source of law-in Kyllo, the "common law." Because, as he wrote, the
expectation of privacy inside the home has its "roots deep in the common
law," 2" the Fourth Amendment "draws 'a firm line at the entrance to the
house.'"
2 45
Justice Scalia issued a similar per se rule in a takings case, Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, in which the Court was asked to weigh
what the landowner might reasonably have expected when he invested in
the parcel at issue. 46 In writing for the majority, Justice Scalia reached,
once again, for the common law as a source of objectivity, which led him
to ask about the "background principles" that the "law of property and
nuisance already place upon land ownership. 2 47 Uses of real property
that run contrary to these principles were "always unlawful," he
241. Id. at 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe Court has quitclaimed to Congress its principal
responsibility in this area of the law. Fairly read, the Court has stated that Congress' actions under
[Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution] are, for all intents and purposes, judicially
unreviewable.").
242. Most often, courts have described these sources as fundamental to the rule of law as we know
it. Thus, in Prater v. U.S. Parole Commission, 802 F.2d 948, 953 (7th Cir. 1986), Judge Posner looked to
the "purpose of forbidding ex post facto laws."
243. 533 U.S. 27, 44 (200) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
244. Id. at 34.
245. Id. at 40 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,590 (198o)).
246. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); see id. at ioi9 (holding that a taking exists "when the owner of real
property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common
good, that is, to leave his property economically idle").
247. Id. at 1029. In concurrence, Justice Kennedy warned that "[tihe finding of no value must be
considered under the Takings Clause by reference to the owner's reasonable, investment-backed
expectations." Id. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)). But even he noted that "reasonable expectations must be understood
in light of the whole of our legal tradition." Id. at 1035.
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reasoned, and therefore the government could have acted "at any point
to make ... those. . . principles ... explicit" without eroding
expectations (and with them, property rights).248 In contrast, Justice
Stevens, in dissent, highlighted "the elastic nature of property rights
249
and stated his preference to let state and local governments "revise the
law governing the rights and uses of property"-thus shaping
expectations accordingly 250
The search for objectivity has its problems, of course, one of which is
the indeterminacy of the common law itself. Consider, for example, the
common law of copyright:"' in the United States, it endured for almost
two centuries, or until January I, 1978, the effective date of the Act by
which Congress abrogated it.25 Under the common law, an author owned
a handful of rights in his expression for so long as he refrained from
making that expression public. 53 If an author exerted physical control
over his manuscript, that control was a clear manifestation that he
intended to appropriate his expression for his own use, or, at most, for
the limited use of a limited group of his acquaintances. 54 In this way, the
expression protected by a common law copyright was not unlike a
248. Id. at 1030 (majority opinion).
249. Id. at io65 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
250. Id. at io69. Both Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens also criticized the per se rule as being
predictable only in theory, as in practice it is difficult to determine whether a regulation has prohibited
all economically beneficial use of land. See id. at 1054 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("As the Court
admits, whether the owner has been deprived of all economic value of his property will depend on how
'property' is defined."). See generally id. at 1036-76 (Blackmun, J., dissenting; Stevens, J. dissenting).
Justice Kennedy, in concurrence, would have defined "reasonable expectations" as those "based on
objective rules and customs that can be understood as reasonable by all parties involved," thus
yielding objectivity in name only. Id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
251. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 657 (1834) ("That an author, at common law, has a
property in his manuscript, and may obtain redress against any one who deprives him of it, or by
improperly obtaining a copy endeavours to realise a profit by its publication, cannot be
doubted .... ). The English case of Donaldson v. Beckett, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1774), is thought to
stand for the proposition that copyright was a right at common law. But see Howard B. Abrams, The
Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29
WAYNE L. REV. I 119, 1128-29 0983):
In Donaldson, the House of Lords firmly rejected the existence of common law copyright.
Yet Donaldson has been cited repeatedly as absolute authority for the existence of common
law copyright as the result of a series of historic errors based on the peculiar vagaries of the
reporting system for decisions of the House of Lords.
This claim raises interesting questions, if purely academic ones.
252. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 301, 90 Stat. 2541, 2572 (1976) (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2000)) ("[O]n or after January i, 1978 ... no person is entitled to any
such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law... of any State.").
253. See Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 657.
254. See id. Under the common law, an author could distribute his work to "a limited class of
persons for a limited purpose without losing that common law copyright." Acad. of Motion Picture
Arts & Scis. v. Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1451 (9th Cir. I99I) (citing Burke v.
Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc., 598 F.2d 688, 691 (ist Cir. 1979)). See generally NIMMER, supra note 9, § 4.3
(discussing limited publication).
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tangible thing. It was capable of being held to oneself: possessed, owned.
If, however, an author chose to make copies of his expression
available to the public, thus forfeiting his rights under common law and
reaping the rewards associated with "publication, 255 then statutory law,
i.e., the Copyright Act, required him to manifest his intention to claim
rights in the work. The author did so in several ways. First, he was
required to affix the proper form of copyright notice to every published
copy of his work.256 Second, he was required to apply to register his claim
of copyright with the Copyright Office, which made records of those
applications available to the public. 5 ' Third, he was required to provide
the Copyright Office (and through it, the public) with "deposit" copies of
his work . If the author did not comply with these formalities before (or,
in the case of registration and deposit, shortly after) the moment of
publication, his work entered the public domain. 59 If, however, the
author perfected his title by complying with the formalities, he succeeded
to the exclusive rights provided by the Copyright Act.26 His statutory
,6,
copyright was born just as his common law copyright expired. If this
statutory copyright were valuable enough, the author engaged in yet
another formality a few decades later by applying to renew his copyright
for a second term of years. 6' As before, failure to comply consigned the
work to the public domain. 
63
Given the importance of publication, and of compliance with the
formalities, I have argued elsewhere that this early copyright (of which
the common law was a part) was, in essence, a printing right-i.e., the
right to print, reprint, and vend copies of a work. 64 But with that right
came responsibilities to the public. Compliance with the formalities upon
publication provided the public with notice of claims under copyright
law-not unlike planting a flag on a parcel of claimed land, an important
255. See Keene v. Wheatley, 14 F. Cas. i8o, I85 (C.C.E.D. Pa. I861) (No. 7644) ("The intended
meaning of the word 'publication,' in this and other statutory provisions concerning copyright, is
publication in print."); see also Am. Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 300 (1907) (holding
that the mere exhibition of a work was not a "publication"); Boucicault v. Fox, 3 F. Cas. 977, 981
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. i69i) (holding that the mere performance of a work was not a
"publication").
256. Act of Mar. 4, 19o9, ch. 320, § 9,35 Stat. 1075, 1077.
257. Id. §§ 10, 47.
258. Id. § 12.
259. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 664-65 (834).
260. Id. at 665.
261. See NIMMER, supra note 9, at § 4.02[C] ("[B]y reason of Wheaton v. Peters it became
accepted.., doctrine that prior to January s, I978... it was the act of publication which divested
common law rights."); see also Donaldson v. Beckett, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1774) (holding that
common law copyright survives publication as long as there is no statutory protection).
262. Act of March 4, 1909 § 23.
263. Id.
264. See Sara K. Stadler, Forging a Truly Utilitarian Copyright, 91 IOWA L. REV. 609, 633-34 (2006).
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indicium of possession. Importantly, though, the formalities also gave
notice to the public of what the author did not claim; the failure to
comply with the formalities sent a signal that the author wished to
renounce possession of his expression, thus tendering it to the public. 6s
As Justice Breyer noted in his dissent in Eldred, before 1976, "most
copyrighted works [fell] into the public domain" after their initial term of
copyright because their owners failed to apply for the renewal term.2"
Thus, the formalities placed possession in those who exerted themselves
to publish their works, even as they provided the public with beneficial
information: which expression was "owned" (or not) and by whom.
Unfortunately, however, the story is not as straightforward as this.
Many creators who elected to reap the rewards associated with
publication failed to comply with one or more of the statutory
formalities. When those creators found themselves in court, they put
judges to a choice: (i) find that publication had occurred and impose the
harsh punishment of forfeiture; (2) redefine "publication" so as to
exclude the acts in which the creator had engaged; or (3) excuse
altogether the failures to comply with the formalities. Not surprisingly, as
often as not, courts chose option (2) or (3).
In their efforts to confine the definition of "publication," for
example, courts held that the public performance of a work was not a
publication; 67 that the public exhibition of a work was not a publication
so long as the owner of the work took "the greatest care ... to prevent
[the public from] copying [it]";2 68 and that a creator did not engage in a
divesting publication by distributing copies of his work to "a limited class
of persons for a limited purpose."z6 When courts could not avoid
concluding that a divesting publication had occurred, they simply
excused any failure to comply with the requisite formalities. 7 ' Over time,
265. See Sterk, supra note 2, at 1224 ("Although the notice requirement served a number of
functions, perhaps the most important was its role in screening out of the copyright system those
works in which the author had no desire for protection.").
266. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 265 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting). This is not surprising,
given that "only about 2% of copyrights between 55 and 75 years old retain commercial value." Id. at
248 (citing EDWARD RAPPAPORT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION: ESTIMATING THE
ECONOMIC VALUES (1998)).
267. Boucicault v. Fox, 3 F. Cas. 977, 981 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 169i); Roberts v. Myers, 20 F.
Cas. 898, 898 (C.C.D. Mass. 186o) (No. ii,9o6) ("[N]o occasion now to consider" whether a
performance at the Winter Garden Theater in New York on December 6, 1859 "would have precluded
the author from taking out a copyright under the statute of 1831 ... because acting or representing is
not a publication. It has been so decided in England ... ").
268. Am. Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284,300 (1907).
269. Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis. v. Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1451
(9th Cir. i99i) (citing Burke v. Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc., 598 F.2d 688, 691 (iSt Cir. 1979)). Courts carved
out these "limited publication[s]" to "mitigate the harsh forfeiture effects of a divesting general
publication." Id. at 1452.
270. See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 161 F.2d 406, 409-10 (2d Cir.
1947) (excusing errors of notice and failure to timely renew).
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discontent with the formalities increased, and in 1976, Congress rendered
the concept of publication largely obsolete by hinging protection on
"fixation" 27 1
-thus abrogating the common law copyright, which it
termed "anachronistic, uncertain, impractical, and highly complicated. ' 72
This process "culminated in successor legislation like the Berne
Convention Implementation Act, the Copyright Renewal Act, and the
Copyright Term Extension Act, [in which] Congress pared back, and in
some instances entirely discarded, [the] copyright formalities. 2 73
If Congress were to enact a law reflecting the "background
principles" found in the common law of copyright, it would have to begin
by deciding whether that law resided in the rules or in the judicial efforts
to avoid them. It also would have to decide how to adapt that law to the
profound changes in technology that have made it possible to engage in
hitherto unknown uses of copyrighted works. If, as seems likely, the
nature of publication itself has changed, perhaps forever, then why
should Congress turn back the clock? To quote the dissenters in Lucas,
why risk "freez[ing] the.., common law" '74 by treating as "magical...
the reasoning of judges [and Congresses] long dead"? '75 In truth, how one
feels about the history of copyright, the concept of publication, the
formalities, and even the reasoning and results in cases like Eldred
depends upon the philosophy of copyright that one finds most
persuasive. And the history of copyright provides plenty of evidence to
support almost any philosophy to which one might subscribe. Revisiting
the principles of the common law of copyright may indeed be "right," in
that living by those principles may be the best way in which to "promote
the Progress of Science. '276 In the end, however, locating the
"background principles" of copyright in its common law is no more
objective than was the selection of the pertinent "law[s] of property and
nuisance" in Lucas.77 If the search for objectivity has its problems, then
this is one of them: There is, in fact, no such thing as objectivity.
III. WHAT CREATORS SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO EXPECT
I have argued that copyright law "mirror[s] and reflect[s]" what
authors claim to require in terms of incentives to create, even as those
incentives (through the vehicle of expectation) "form and project" the
271. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § I02(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2544-45 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000)).
272. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 129 (1976).
273. Sprigman, supra note 75, at 487.
274. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, IO68 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
275. Id. at 1055 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
276. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
277. 505 U.S. at 1029. As Justice Blackmun wrote, in dissent, "Although it refers to state nuisance
and property law, the Court apparently does not mean just any state nuisance and property law." Id. at
1052 n.15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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increasing breadth of copyright.27 s While it may be impossible to locate
an objective source of law outside this circularity of expectation, it
nonetheless may be possible to break the circle.
In an article on the subject of transitions from one tax system to
another (as with, say, the transition from an income tax to a consumption
tax), Professor Graetz pointed out the inherent circularity in arguments
that the government had an obligation to compensate those taxpayers
who acted in reliance on existing law.279 "In short," he wrote, "the
argument asserts that people have a right to protection merely
because... they now expect such protection ... and their asserted rights
legitimate their expectations."" Because, as one suspects, government
does not have the resources to compensate everyone with a reliance
interest, government would never be able to adopt a new tax system
unless the circularity of expectation were broken. According to Professor
Graetz, the way to escape this trap is to "be guided not by the existence
of expectations, but rather by some independent normative vision of
what people should be entitled to expect."2"I If law is an instrument of
behavior-and it is-then the public, through its elected representatives,
must decide what behavior it wishes both to encourage and to
discourage's' Making this decision requires one to ask not what rights
people actually expect, but what rights they should be entitled to expect.
To put it in terms of incentive, "[w]hat we want.., is not merely an
incentive but the right incentive.2S83
Everybody knows that copyright law exists to "promote the Progress
of Science,"""S4 but more than two centuries after the founding, nobody
seems to know what that means. The utilitarian orthodoxy of copyright
holds that the law "exists not to 'provide a special private benefit,""" but
"'to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good,"'286 which
Congress stimulates by providing creators with the rights that generate
incentives. In satisfaction of these incentives, and thus in furtherance of
the "general public good," Congress has presided over a startling
278. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
279. See Graetz, supra note 31, at 1823.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. See David McGowan, Copyright Nonconsequentialism, 69 Mo. L. REV. I, 66 (2004):
One cannot criticize laws as unjust without at least some sense of a normative baseline
defining what is just .... Public choice is a way of life in lawmaking; it is a constant. It
therefore cannot distinguish good laws from bad. Laws must be judged on their substance
and the values they express.
283. DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW'S ORDER 135 (2ooo) (emphasis added), cited in Mark A. Lemley,
Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1059 (2005).
284. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
285. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. I86, 245 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)).
286. Id. (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (I975)).
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enlargement of private rights (which, in turn, causes creators to expect
more "stimulation"). But this is not simply a story of legislative capture;
the problem is definitional. Like Justice Breyer in Eldred, Congress has
not considered what it means to provide creators with an inducement to
create: is its role to provide creators with the greatest possible incentive;
or as Professor Lessig put it, do "we protect intellectual property to
provide the owner sufficient incentive to produce such property"?s" The
first definition of "incentive" would require Congress either to ignore the
public interest in copyright or (more cleverly) to declare, as James
Madison once did, that "[t]he public good fully coincides.., with the
claims of individuals"2-regardless of how large those claims might
become. The second definition of "incentive," by contrast, would require
Congress to mediate the needs and wants of creators, distributors, users,
and consumers in the way that best serves the public interest, thus
requiring Congress to regulate in a way that it has done only in bits and
pieces." The first definition likely would require Congress to provide
creators with something very near to "perfect control" over their works;
the second definition almost certainly would not."9 Either way, Congress
must decide,29 ' which means that it must begin by deciding to decide.
To be sure, creators now expect to enjoy certain rights, and,
therefore, "[t]he 'demoralization' costs of undermining these
expectations may be considerable." 9 ' As with tax transitions, however, to
avoid these costs would be to confirm existing entitlements indefinitely.
If copyright has located or defined the scope of rights in a suboptimal
way, then it may be redistributive to change those rights. But as
Professor Cohen has observed, the use of the word "redistributive" begs
the question.93 That is, "[t]he rhetoric of redistribution simply masks the
underlying dispute." '94 This is not to say that changing the rules would be
287. Lessig, supra note 8, at 638 (citing Russell Lombardy, The Myth of Market Power: Why
Market Power Should Not Be Presumed When Applying Antitrust Principles to the Analysis of Tying
Agreements Involving Intellectual Property, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 449, 453-54 (1996)).
288. See THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 272 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961), quoted in
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212 n.i8.
289. See Patterson, supra note 2, at 61 ("Unless courts agree either that copyright is proprietary or
that it is regulatory in nature, the confusion of copyright law will continue, because this dual
conceptual basis has led to the confused state of copyright law today."). Those bits and pieces may be
found in sections I I I to 122 of the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 151-122 (20oo); accord Wu, supra
note 3, at 289-91 (discussing each provision).
290. See Lessig, supra note 8, at 638 ("'Sufficient incentive,' however, is something less than
'perfect control."').
295. But see Karjala, supra note Io, at 163 ("We cannot expect Congress to attempt to solve the
problem, let alone come up with a solution that optimizes the public interest, by focusing on copyright
law alone. The answer must come from outside of copyright or from the courts.").
292. Breyer, supra note 20, at 322 (footnote omitted).
293. Cohen, supra note 20, at 511.
294. Id.; see also id. ("Redistribution cannot be defined with reference to initial entitlements, and it
is nearly always the scope of those entitlements that is contested.").
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easy or painless.29 Yet the difficulty of the task should not lead us to
conclude, as Professor Hughes may have done, that "copyright law
already establishes a relatively broad range of entitlements" and that
"[o]ur cultural industries, institutions, and individuals are too successful
and too influential to tinker with that. ' 6 It is, of course, the role of
Congress to tinker, and if necessary, to destroy and rebuild. If Congress
is reluctant to assume this role, then the public (including the academy)
bears the burden of convincing a reluctant Congress to act.
What, then, should creators be entitled to expect? This is a policy
question, and also an empirical one. Practically speaking, it would be
simpler to conclude that creators are entitled to expect everything, for it
would not require much tinkering to provide creators with perfect
control over their works. Indeed, Congress arguably has been treading
this very path. As a result, it is easy to imagine how such a world might
look: by fixing an original work in a tangible form, creators would
succeed to the exclusive right to use their works in any way, for any
purpose. This right would endure for a period approaching perpetuity,
which likely would constitute a "limited Time[ ]'297 after Eldred, so long
as that duration were expressed in a term of years."' The world would
consist of content providers (otherwise known as "licensors") and the
rest of us. Any reproduction, any distribution, any performance, any
display, any use would have to be licensed, and those who wished to
create new works by adapting existing ones would have to take a license
too. The First Amendment would require some exceptions to be made,
of course, but as Professor Gordon famously observed, fair use exists
primarily to remedy market failure.299 In a world in which organizations
like the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers and the
Copyright Clearance Center exist-i.e., in a world in which markets do
not fail-the fair use doctrine simply would "become irrelevant" for "the
great bulk of uses previously excused because of transactions costs."3"
If, as I suspect, this "normative vision" would impede learning
instead of promoting it, Congress might conclude that creators are
entitled only to expect rights sufficient to produce an optimal level of
295. See Yochai Benkler, Intellectual Property and the Organization of Information Production, 22
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 8i, 98-99 (2002) ("[T]hese adverse effects may be difficult to reverse.... [T]he
process begun by a change in law may be path determining, and may lock an economy into sub-
optimal arrangements indefinitely.").
296. Hughes, supra note 2, at 787.
297. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
298. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199 (2003) ("The word 'limited,' however, does not
convey a meaning so constricted. At the time of the Framing, that word meant what it means today:
'confine[d] within certain bounds,' 'restrain[ed],' or 'circumscribe[d]."') (quoting S. JOHNSON, A
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1151 (7th ed. 1785)).
299. See sources cited supra note 6.
300. Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in a Changing World, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 133, 137 (2003).
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incentive. This, of course, may be easier said than done. It seems clear, as
Professor Mark Lemley has argued, that the "'optimal incentive'.. . [is]
not the largest incentive possible," but beyond that, it promises to be
exceedingly difficult to identify the point at which "it would be inefficient
to withhold works from the public domain in order to provide ever-
decreasing 'incentives' to their creators."3 ' As Professor Cohen put it,
"[T]he model is indeterminate without an underlying conception of
social welfare or utility. Something must be optimized, but what? And
how should it be measured?""3 2
To date, Congress has not asked these questions, but its failure to do
so does not make them "imponderable.""3 3 If Congress were to
investigate the nature of the public interest in copyright, it might
discover, for example, that the best way in which to advance that interest
is to use copyright law as no more than a means of identifying and
punishing methods of unfair competition in the relevant markets for
copies of copyrighted works.3 4 But Congress cannot make discoveries
like this without acknowledging that the metric of incentive has led it to
transform the Copyright Act into a statute that the Framers would not
recognize-and not because of changes in technology. Thomas Jefferson,
who "considered copyright a necessary evil.., favored providing just
enough incentive to create, nothing more, and thereafter allowing ideas
to flow freely as nature intended."3 5 Finding the point at which exclusive
rights provide creators with "just enough incentive" would require
lawmakers to engage in something of a balancing act. As Professor
Lemley has observed, however, as "[h]ard as it is to get the balance right,
we will never do it if we simply stop trying.36
CONCLUSION
Copyright scholars have chronicled the unrelenting expansion of
rights under copyright law, and they have offered a number of
explanations for it, including the "constant" of legislative capture. 7
301. Lemley, supra note 7, at 125 ("[T]he goal of intellectual property law is only to provide the
'optimal incentive,' not the largest incentive possible. Past a certain point, it would be inefficient to
withhold works from the public domain in order to provide ever-decreasing 'incentives' to their
creators.").
302. Cohen, supra note 2o, at 551-52.
303. Bell, supra note 13, at 756; see also id. at 746 ("[L]egislators could not strike such a [delicate]
balance [between public and private interests] if they wanted to; thanks to the influence of [the]
copyright lobby, they may not even care to try.").
304. See Sara K. Stadler, Copyright as Trade Regulation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
305. Robert S. Boynton, The Tyranny of Copyright?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 25, 2004, at 43; accord
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 1O-11 (t966) (discussing Thomas Jefferson's view that "the
embarassment of an exclusive patent" was worthwhile only with respect to inventions that would not
be disclosed, or perhaps even created, "but for the inducement of a patent").
3o6. Lemley, supra note 283, at IO67.
307. See McGowan, supra note 282, at 66 ("Public choice is a way of life in lawmaking; it is a
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While Congress certainly has been responsive to interest groups in
enacting copyright legislation, legislative capture is not entirely (or even
mostly) to blame for a problem that is rooted primarily in history and
rhetoric. In 1932, a creator named Margaret Widdemer testified that "it
would be nicer if we had all the respect to which we are entitled, which
would be given us by this copyright bill. Also it would be nicer if we had
all the sales."' 8 Creators, like most "[i]ndividuals with a modicum of self-
interest," want everything to which they might be entitled." This desire
has shaped the history of copyright, which is a story of wants in search of
theory by which to justify them. A century ago, that theory was the
philosophy of natural right."I Today, it is the language of incentives.
In this Article, I have argued that the incentive theory in copyright
law is plagued by a circularity of expectation: with the stated goal of
generating creative "incentive," the law asks what rights creators expect
to enjoy; it grants rights in satisfaction of those expectations; and each
new grant raises expectations among creators, thus forming the basis of
demands for more rights. In defining legal rights by reference to
incentives, which are satisfied (or not) depending on what creators
expect, Congress has ceded to creators the power to locate the
boundaries of copyright law. Courts cannot relocate those boundaries
without deciding which incentives are legitimate and which ones are not,
and as Justice Breyer learned in Eldred, courts do not have the tools to
make that decision. Only Congress can make it. There simply is no use in
pretending that copyright can be fixed in any other way. In a world of
neat conclusions, this one is decidedly messy: until Congress decides
which rights creators are entitled to expect from copyright law (and
which rights they are not), no amount of tinkering around the edges can
prevent the law from becoming an instrument of increasingly "perfect
control"3 ' -thus producing "a nation of infringers" '3 12 who honor that law
only in the breach.
constant.").
308. General Revision of the Copyright Law, supra note 75, at 90 (statement of Margaret
Widdemer).
309. See Richard A. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the Foundation of Copyright Law,
42 SAN DIEGo L. REV. I, 19 (2005) ("Individuals with a modicum of self-interest will claim all that the
law allows them to achieve through unilateral action.").
310. See Dennis S. Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U.
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